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The gender revolution of the mid-20th century resulted in extensive changes in social, 
economic, and policy realms. With their unprecedented entrance into the paid labor market, 
women moved toward greater economic independence. However, it remains unclear whether 
these changes in women’s economic well-being resulted in positive change for women across the 
class spectrum. The large-scale entrance of women into paid labor was not accompanied by 
men’s equal take up in unpaid domestic work. Thus, women found themselves struggling to 
balance work and family life and as a result, gender inequality in employment outcomes persists. 
In this dissertation I explore the claim that in the absence of government provided support to 
reconcile work and family, less privileged women (i.e. women of lower social class) face greater 
challenges in balancing work and family life than more privileged women. If women’s 
responsibility for unpaid domestic work is causing women to trail behind men in the paid labor 
market, then women’s possibility to outsource unpaid domestic labor will affect their 
participation in the paid labor market. There is a greater ability among women of higher social 
class to outsource domestic labor or use market substitutes. Therefore, in countries that have not 
implemented generous work-family reconciliation policies I expect less privileged women to be 
more economically dependent on their male partners than more privileged women. 
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To assess these expectations, I revisit traditional analysis of gender inequality and 
develop a measure of economic dependence to assess women’s economic well-being across the 
class spectrum in 22 Western countries. While most evaluations of women’s agency have 
assumed that workforce participation is itself a measure of independence, this dissertation goes 
beyond this assumption and assesses women’s economic dependence by measuring women’s 
share of the couple’s joint income. I use a comprehensive earnings measure, augmented 
earnings, which consists of labor market earnings, as well as public and private transfers, and 
capital income. The analysis is framed in terms of national level work-family reconciliation 
policies, thus revealing how different policies influence not only women’s economic 
independence, but also the distribution of that independence across social classes.  
I first provide an extensive cross-national descriptive analysis of women’s employment 
outcomes (e.g. employment rates, work intensity, and female to male earnings ratios), and 
women’s share of the couple’s joint income. Both employment outcomes and economic 
dependence are analyzed by family type and class status (class is measured with household 
income and education).  
The findings from these descriptive chapters reveal three major gender gaps in modern 
Western society: 1) in employment rates, 2) hours among the employed, 3) and earnings per 
hour. I find that even when accounting for transfers, in all countries, women contribute on 
average less than 50% to their household income and in some instances as low as 20%. However, 
the degree of dependency does vary by class and country. Overall countries with more generous 




Following the descriptive analysis, I employ a random effect within-between model 
(REWB) to explore whether the effect of class (measured with education) on women’s economic 
dependence is moderated by work-family reconciliation policy. Specifically, I analyze the cross-
level interaction effect of class and work-family reconciliation policy on women’s augmented 
earnings relative to the median man in their country. I run the regression models for all women, 
not just those in employment. Thus, my dependent variable, relative earnings, is a composite 
index meant to capture the three major gender gaps: in employment, earnings, and work 
intensity. Findings reveal that being less educated significantly decreases women’s relative 
earnings, but the association between education and relative earnings is moderated by work-
family reconciliation policy.  
In countries with an “ideal” maternity leave, exclusive paternity leave, more childcare 
support and more extensive working time regulations, the negative effect of low education on 
relative earnings is lessened. First, in countries that have these policies in place, women of all 
levels of education do better than in countries with less generous work-family reconciliation 
policies. Second, there is also less class inequality among women in countries with these 
policies. That is, the gap in relative earnings between women of different levels of education is 
smaller than in countries without these policies. Finally, I find that the moderating effect of 
work-family reconciliation policies can operate through more than one pathway, i.e., via 
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 Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
Two enduring questions linger in the wake of the host of mid-to late-20th century reforms, 
prompted by second wave feminism and collectively known as the “gender revolution”: to what 
extent has women’s growing labor force participation produced an expansion of women’s 
independence, and second, to what extent have advancements in women’s independence been 
evenly distributed across the class spectrum? 
The main objective of this dissertation is to examine the interplay between class1  and 
gender, two densely intertwined axes of inequality. While extensive research exists on class 
inequality among families, and among men, little research has been done on class inequality 
between men and women and among women as such. This dissertation attempts to fill in this gap 
in the literature. The gender revolution resulted in extensive changes in social, economic and 
policy realms. However, it is unclear whether these changes resulted in positive change for 
women across the class spectrum. The optimal way to answer that question is to develop a new 
measure of women’s dependence, one which is focused on earnings power rather than simply 
individual earnings or household income.  
One reason why scholars have devoted little attention to the topic of class inequality 
among women is the assumption that a woman’s class position is determined less by her own 
earnings than by her household income (which, if she is married, is composed primarily of her 
husband’s income). This assumption is rooted in the idea of the male-breadwinner model, in 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation I use social class and class interchangeably. Social scientists use a wide array of measures and 
observations to try to understand and capture class differences. The most commonly used measures to distinguish 
between the “haves” and the “have-less” are, income, education and occupation (Hout, 2008). I operationalize class 
with two separate measures: household income and level of educational attainment.  
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which men are the primary earners and women (even when they work for pay) are the primary 
caregivers. From this perspective, women’s social class is mediated by men rather than 
determined by a woman’s status relative to other women (McCall, 2010).  
The assumptions that have led scholars to ignore class inequality among women are 
problematic for two empirical reasons: first, it is unclear whether women’s economic 
dependence endures in a world where women occupy an increasing share of the workforce. 
Second, these assumptions have prevented scholars from investigating the consequences of 
women’s labor force participation across social classes. There is an additional, theoretical 
problem which emerges from existing androcentric models of inequality: in ignoring inequality 
as it exists among women, scholarship has failed to capture the way inequality is potentially 
experienced by over half of the world's human population.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to redress these shortcomings by directly addressing the 
question of women’s economic dependence on their male partners. An examination of economic 
dependency will reveal both the extent to which women’s economic well-being has become 
detached from male earnings, and the degree to which women’s dependence varies across the 
class spectrum. While considerable research exists on women’s economic dependence in the US, 
few have extended this analysis cross-nationally. In this dissertation, I respond to this lacuna by 
measuring women’s economic dependence on their male partners across the class spectrum in 22 
Western countries. Moreover, I conduct a cross-national multilevel analysis to determine the 
extent to which several factors affect women’s dependence in Western countries. These include 
demographic (micro-level) factors such as age, motherhood, and family size, as well as 
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institutional (macro-level) factors, with a focus on work-family reconciliation policies.2 Thus, 
this dissertation pursues the valuable but overlooked question of how state interventions and 
their effects vary in their application across the class spectrum. 
In essence, my dissertation responds to recent world-historical events, investigating how 
shifts in gender relations across the Western world have influenced the relative autonomy of 
women across the class spectrum today. The gender revolution of the middle-to-late 20th century 
saw the large-scale entrance of women into the labor market. As a result, the gender employment 
gap is now narrower than it has ever been (OECD, 2012). This unprecedented entrance of 
women into the labor market occurred concurrently with large-scale macro-economic shifts, 
most specifically the decline in the historically masculine fields of skilled labor and 
manufacturing in Europe and North America, and the rise of a less gender-segregated service 
sector. As a consequence, the gender earnings gap in most Western countries has, to varying 
degrees, decreased (OECD, 2012).   
Taken together, the literature on the gender revolution and on the decline of male-
dominated working-class jobs would seem to indicate the decline of the male-breadwinner 
model. A fundamental question to emerge from these historical trends is whether women’s 
position in the household income distribution retains its dependence on partners’ earnings.  
Of course, the gender revolution did not play out the same way in all Western countries. 
Second-wave feminists in the postwar West all fought to end women’s economic oppression. 
However, with little global consensus on whether the emphasis of the movement should be on 
the labor market or the home as a site for women’s emancipation, the women’s movement 
                                                          
2 For the purpose of this dissertation “work-family reconciliation policies” serves as an umbrella term for all those 
policies that are meant to support adults who are balancing parenthood and employment. These policies may or may 
not enhance gender equality in paid and unpaid work; that depends on how they are designed. 
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looked acutely different across the world, particularly in social policy implementation 
(Eisenstein, 2009: Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010: Tong & Fernandes Botts, 2017). But social 
policy design can have an impact on how families negotiate divisions of labor inside and outside 
the home.  
I will examine women’s economic dependence across 22 Western countries and explore 
how work-family reconciliation policy provisions affects women’s independence in those 
countries and if the generosity of said policies might affect the relationship between women’s 
social class and their level of independence.  
In this dissertation I explore the legacy of second-wave feminism half-a-century after the 
movement’s birth, using dependence on household income as a prism to evaluate women’s 
independence in the developed world today. There is an ongoing debate in the US and other 
high-income countries on the effect of work-family reconciliation policies on gender inequality. 
Research suggests that countries with extensive work-family reconciliation policies have the 
highest women’s labor force participation, and the highest fertility rates, and they have been 
much more successful than other countries in increasing the labor force participation of mothers 
(See Mandel & Semyonov, 2006; Gornick & Meyer, 2003; Gornick, Meyers, & Ross, 1997).  
However, other scholars argue that while some work-family reconciliation policies 
facilitate women’s work, they do not enhance women’s occupational and economic 
achievements. In fact, the argument continues, work-family reconciliation policies such as 
maternity and parental leave3 are seen as possibly detrimental to the second wave feminist goal 
                                                          
3 Throughout the dissertation I use the term “maternity leave” to refer to paid leave after childbirth that is 
exclusively for mothers, “paternity leave” to refer to paid leave exclusively for fathers, and finally “parental leave” 
which refers to a longer period of job protected paid leave that is available to both parents. All OECD countries, 
except the US, offer paid maternity leave and more and more countries offer parental leave. Mothers tend to use 
much of their maternity leave and often extend it by taking some of the parental leave available. In countries that 
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of enhancing women’s autonomy and economic agency. In essence, these scholars argue that 
policies that enable maternity leave - especially long maternity leaves - may encourage mothers 
to drop out of the labor market or rely on part-time work, creating a harder and lower glass 
ceiling for women (put another way, though more women may be in the workforce, their net 
occupational success is lower than in countries with less generous work-family reconciliation 
policies). This is believed to be caused by reluctance on the part of employers to put women (as 
opposed to men) in time-demanding senior positions out of fear of later losing them on maternity 
leave (Mandel & Semyonov, 2006). In economic terms, employers statistically discriminate 
against women, believing—in many cases correctly—that women will take up parental leave 
opportunities more often than men. 
Debates over these work-family reconciliation policies require a further consideration of 
how we measure gender inequality. There are many ways of thinking about and measuring 
gender inequality. However, the most common measures of the success or failure of work-family 
reconciliation policies in achieving gender equality capture only a meagre portion of women’s 
lived experiences. Women’s labor force participation, mothers’ labor force participation, 
percentage of women in managerial positions, percentage of women working full-time/part-time: 
these are all labor force statistics. As important as they are, these measures do not capture 
women’s autonomy. They do not capture the full portrait of woman’s economic dependence, 
only her economic participation. 
At a much more fundamental level (a level overlooked by much of the scholarship), 
gender equality means women no longer being dependent on their male partners for their 
                                                          
offer paternity leave fathers tend to take at least some of it but very few extend their leave by using part of the 




economic well-being. If we wish to examine the effect of work-family reconciliation policies on 
women’s economic well-being, I argue that we need to measure the extent to which women-of 
all classes-retain their dependence on their male partners. With this dissertation I offer an insight 
into the relationship between class and gender with three separate analysis. I first examine 
women’s position in the labor market by class; I then provide a descriptive analysis of women’s 
economic independence by class, and finally I use multilevel analysis to assess whether the 
relationship between class (measured by education) and women’s earnings relative to the median 
man in their country is moderated by countries’ work-family reconciliation policies. 
I expect to find that countries that have sought to harmonize work and family life through 
generous and gender egalitarian work-family reconciliation policies—that is, policies aimed at 
strengthening both women’s ties to the labor market and men’s participation in the unpaid 
caregiving that takes place in the home—will exhibit positive results for women’s independence, 
distributed relatively evenly across the class spectrum. On the other hand, countries that have not 
implemented extensive work-family reconciliation policies but may have either concentrated 
their gender equalizing efforts at strengthening women’s ties to the labor force (by 
implementing, for example, equal pay protections or gender-based affirmative action policies) or 
the home (e.g., home care allowances) will show positive results for women’s autonomy 
concentrated at the upper-end of the class spectrum.  
The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to develop a more robust metric of women’s 
economic well-being and apply this metric to evaluate claims of polarizing class inequality 
among women. This dissertation is framed so that it might contribute to ongoing debates about 
how different national-level policies have influenced women’s independence.  
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Following this introduction, I offer a theoretical and empirical review of relevant 
literature, in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I discuss the data and methods used in Chapters 4-6. In 
Chapter 4, I analyze women’s labor market status in 22 Western countries, both in the absolute 
and relative to men’s outcomes.  This includes examining more common measures of women’s 
labor market attachment such as women’s employment rates, women’s median earnings, and the 
percentage of employed women working part-time/full-time. I report women’s engagement in 
paid work by class status and family type. For the purpose of this research, I define women’s 
class status with two separate measures: women’s educational attainment and women’s 
household income.  
In Chapter 5, I focus on the subset of women that have male partners and assess their 
dependence on those male partners. I do this by examining women’s share of the couple’s joint 
income measured by dividing her augmented earnings over the couple's joint augmented 
earnings.4 I also assess women’s economic dependence by class.  
Having provided a thorough descriptive analysis of women’s economic dependence and 
engagement in paid work by class, I turn to multilevel modeling in Chapter 6. I test my 
expectation that women’s economic independence is more evenly distributed across the class 
spectrum in countries that have implemented more generous and gender egalitarian work-family 
reconciliation policies.  
There is a rich and ever evolving literature on what was historically labelled as the 
woman-friendly welfare state (Hernes, 1987)5. Conducting comparative research on the topic is 
challenging, though, because of the complex and multidimensional nature of policy design. I use 
                                                          
4 “Augmented” earnings will be defined later to mean a combination of labor market and transfer income, with both 
captured at the person-level. 
5 In this dissertation I use the more precise term work-family reconciliation policy. 
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the “dual-earner/dual-caregiver” model as a guide when selecting and designing the policy 
indicators used in this dissertation. The dual-earner/dual-caregiver model envisions a society 
where mothers and fathers both engage in paid market work and unpaid caregiving (Crompton, 
1999: Gornick & Meyers, 2003). In other words, this model highlights the policies that are likely 
to strengthen women’s ties to the labor market but also men’s involvement in the home. Gornick 
and Meyers suggest that work-family reconciliation policies that support not only gender 
equality in employment but also in parenthood include paid leave for mothers and fathers, 
publicly funded day-care, and working time regulations that shorten regular hours, increase the 
availability and quality of reduced-hour work, and/or grant workers control over their hours.  
In Chapter 6, I test my hypotheses by conducting a cross-national multilevel analysis to 
determine the effects of state intervention at the country level as well as the effect of individual 
level variables such as family characteristics on economic dependency. I assess women’s 
economic dependence (dependent variable) by measuring women’s augmented earnings relative 
to the median man in their country.  From the country level standpoint, I want to evaluate the 
extent to which work-family reconciliation policies influence women’s economic dependence 
after controlling for each country’s population in terms of age and family characteristics. 
Moreover, I evaluate whether the effect of education (i.e., social class) on dependency is 
contingent on work-family reconciliation policies.  
As Chapter 4 will show, solely relying on labor market statistics can be misleading when 
assessing gender equality in a country, because of the high number of women that are not being 
considered because they either work part-time or not at all. Most labor market statistics only look 
at people that are employed full time and ignore the fact that there are essentially three major 
gender gaps to address: 1) in employment rates, 2) hours among the employed, 3) and earnings 
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per hour. The only way to get a full picture of gender equality is to assess all three. Chapter 6 ties 
back to this discussion in Chapter 4 and uses, as a dependent variable in the multilevel analysis, a 
composite measure that combines all three.  
Thus, in Chapter 6, I analyze the interaction effect of class and work-family 
reconciliation policy on women's augmented earnings divided by the median mans’ augmented 
earnings. This dependent variable includes women who only work part time, but it also includes 
women who are not working at all. In other words, it includes “zeros”.  
However, there is a limitation to using this composite measure as a dependent variable 
when studying policy effects. This limitation stems from the inability to discern how the policy is 
affecting the outcome variable. Indeed, is the policy in question affecting women’s relative 
earnings by raising their employment rate, their hours, or their earnings? Thus, after estimating 
the effect of work-family reconciliation policy and class on all women’s augmented earnings 
relative to the median man, I run the hierarchical linear model (HLM) two more times, 
estimating women’s relative earnings without the zeros (thus netting out the employment effect) 
and again women’s earnings among full-time working women (thus largely netting out the hours 
effect).  
Finally, I conclude in Chapter 7 with a summary and discussion of the findings from the 
four empirical chapters.  
The overall goal of this dissertation is to revisit traditional analysis of gender inequality 
by developing a measure of dependence and using that measure to assess women’s economic 
well-being across the class spectrum. The interplay between women’s employment patterns and 
inter-household income inequality has been at the heart of much social science discussion. 
However, it remains unclear how changes in women’s roles in the 20th century affected the 
10 
 
economic well-being of women across the class spectrum. The best way to assess that is by 
going beyond labor force statistics and measuring women’s economic dependence by class. The 
research design in this dissertation is enhanced by its cross-national framework and promises to 
make a substantial contribution to sociological knowledge on the connection between gender 
inequality and class inequality, as well as by contributing to public policy debates.    
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Chapter 2  
Empirical and Theoretical Literature Review and Introduction of Current Research 
 
The birth of second-wave feminism in the early 1960s marked a change in the way that 
women’s progress and gender equality were popularly understood. Second-wave feminists 
moved beyond the political victories of the suffragettes. The second-wave was a broad, diverse 
movement, with theorists and activists focusing on a range of issues including reproductive 
rights and intimate partner violence. But at the most fundamental level, second-wave feminists 
fought to expand the agency of women (Eisenstein, 2009; Tong & Fernandes Botts, 2017). 
As a consequence of this new generation of feminism and the widespread mobilization of 
related activism, the late 20th century saw the large-scale entrance of women into the labor 
market. This demographic shift coincided with increasing efforts at securing gender equality in 
the workforce through legislation. Moreover, the decline of skilled labor and manufacturing in 
the industrialized West and the rise of the service sector seemed to signal the opening of an 
economic era more hospitable to women in the workforce. Because of these major shifts in the 
labor market landscape, the gender earnings gap in most Western countries has decreased, 
although it has been narrowing at a slower pace in the last couple of decades (OECD, 2012). 
However, despite these macro-economic and social trends, it remains difficult to evaluate 
the absolute impact of women’s entrance into the labor market on their overall economic 
dependence and well-being, particularly in comparison with men.  Moreover, it has not been 
thoroughly researched if this revolution was equally beneficial to all women. Second-wave 
feminism (and the gender revolution that followed) has been criticized for benefitting already-
privileged women (i.e., women in higher social classes). This criticism has only grown stronger 
in recent years as feminist activists and scholars alike argue that while some women might have 
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gained parity with men, these gains have been made on the shoulders of less privileged women. 
From this perspective, the gender revolution caused an ever-widening polarization among 
women in the West (Esping-Andersen, 2009).  
The 1990s saw the emergence of third-wave feminism arising as a response to the 
perceived failure of the second wave (see Gillis, Howie, Munford, 2007). Third-wave feminism 
attempts to expand the movement to be more inclusive and acknowledge that women come from 
different socio-economic backgrounds, and are of different races, nationalities, religions and 
cultural backgrounds. They should therefore not be treated as one entity. On account of the Third 
Wave, research on the intersection of gender, class and race has grown substantially in recent 
decades.  
Family policy research has historically treated women as one homogenous group and 
ignored the possible varying effects of family policies on women of different social class, race, 
and nationality. This has been changing in recent years as more family policy research 
incorporates women’s socioeconomic status into their analysis (see O’Leary, 2007; O’Leary and 
Kornbluh, 2009; Levin-Epstein, 2006; Korpi, Ferrarini, Englund, 2013; Williams and Boushey, 
2010; Dodson, Manuel, & Bravo, 2002; Heymann, 2005; Shalev, 2008). 
 
Economic Dependency 
One question that has emerged from these historical trends is whether women’s position 
in the household income distribution retains its dependence on partner earnings or whether the 
gender revolution of the second-wave was successful in increasing women’s independence.  
Historically there was a logic to women’s economic dependence. For much of the course 
of Western modernity, marriage consisted of specialized gender roles. Women stayed home and 
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took care of the home and children, while men were the breadwinners.6 The commitment that 
comes with marriage offered women the protection they needed, and in exchange they stayed 
home and raised the children. Thus, in the not too distant past sociologists and economists alike 
saw wives’ economic dependence as unproblematic. Family sociologists emphasized the 
importance of sex-role segregation where the wife specialized in emotional and affective activity 
and the husband in instrumental activity. These perspectives emphasized the “trade” implicit in 
the husband-wife relationship and conclude that this arrangement is the outcome of rational 
decisions that maximize the resources of the family. Women are economically dependent on men 
who in turn depend on women to make their home and tend to their children (Parsons, 1942: 
Becker 1974: Becker, Landis and Michaels, 1977). Becker (1974) argued that household labor is 
not gendered, but rather a function of time and effort spent in the labor market. The partner with 
higher earning potentials invests more time in the labor market and the partner who has the lower 
income prospects takes on a larger share of the domestic work. In other words, rules governing 
the division of household work are tied to relations of economic support.  
Becker (1974) further predicted that a fall in the relative income stature of young men 
(versus young women) would lessen the gains for household specialization which in turn would 
reduce the prevalence of marriage. In a recent article Autor et al (2018) found support for 
Becker’s prediction when they showed that declines in male dominated manufacturing jobs are 
associated with a decline in marriage rates among young men and women, whereas declines in 
female dominated jobs are associated with an increase in marriage. While Becker’s theory states 
that household specialization is not gendered these results—which show that diminished 
earnings capacity of men results in lower rates of marriage whereas women’s diminished 
                                                          
6 In most countries this was only the reality of middle-class/upper middle-class households. Women of working 
class have always worked outside the home while also being responsible for the work inside the home.  
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earnings is associated with an increase in marriage—imply that while the decision to marry may 
involve rational calculations over expected utility, those calculations occur in environments that 
are clearly gendered. This raises an interesting question: what happens within marriages when 
men’s earnings diminish or women’s earnings increase?   
Trying to explain persistent inequalities in the division of household labor among married 
couples, at a time in which women have entered the workforce almost on par with men, these 
quid pro quo explanations come up short. Social exchange, bargaining and contract models all 
predicted that women would be able to negotiate a more equal sharing of unpaid work7 
performed in the home once they became more active in the labor market (Breen and Cooke, 
2005: Blau, 1960: Blood & Wolfe, 1960: England and Farkas, 1986). While most women, 
including mothers, are now engaged in employment, the allocation of time spent on housework 
and child care by men and women remains highly unequal. The consequences of being almost 
solely responsible for the unpaid domestic work is that women cannot participate fully in the 
paid labor market. Women are more likely than men to make adjustments between domestic 
work and work in the paid labor force and they are also more likely than men to respond to 
responsibilities at home by modifying or reducing their paid employment (Geist, 2005). This in 
turn makes women more likely to be economically dependent on their male partners.  
As Arlie Hochschild (1989) famously put it, the revolution is stalled. Despite all the gains 
women have made in the last fifty or so years, progress is far from complete. Hochschild 
describes the unpaid work performed in the home by employed women as the “second shift.” 
Since the publication of her research the difference in time spent on domestic labor between 
                                                          
7 Throughout the dissertation I use the terms “unpaid work” “domestic labor” or “domestic work” interchangeably to 
refer to the unpaid work performed in the home. Unless otherwise noted, this includes both housework (e.g. cooking 
and cleaning) and the caring for children.  
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married men and women has decreased in size. While men have to some extent increased their 
participation in household tasks the main reason the gap between time spent by men and women 
on housework and child care has decreased, is because women are spending considerably less 
time on unpaid work now than they did 30 or 40 years ago.  
The reason why women are spending less time on domestic labor is both because of 
technological advances and because they are now more engaged in paid work and have less time 
for domestic labor. However, taken together the time men and women who have children spend 
in paid and unpaid work combined, women exceed men in all countries (Ragnarsdóttir, Kostecki, 
and Gornick, forthcoming). Ragnarsdóttir et al. examined total work hours (paid market work 
and unpaid house work combined) in 8 out of the 22 countries included in this dissertation. They 
found that when looking at cohabiting men and women with children, women work more total 
work hours per day in every country in their study. The percentage of total work hours that are 
from unpaid work ranged from 60.9% (France) to 72.3% (Germany) for women, but 29.3% 
(Italy) to 46.1% (Sweden) for men.  
Despite the changes in women’s employment patterns, and even in attitudes once thought 
to reinforce the sexual division of labor, housework and child rearing remains primarily women’s 
work. With the rise of dual-earner families a new challenge has arisen: a growing share of the 
workforce is seeking to balance work and family. But, the pursuit of a work-family balance is 
overwhelmingly placed on the shoulders of women (Brines, 1994; Blau & Winkler, 2017). Due 
to this unequal burden, home responsibilities tend to disproportionality affect women’s and 
especially mothers' paid labor activity on a range of dimensions. This can be manifested in the 
occupations they choose, or the hours that they work and can have consequent effects on their 
earnings trajectories (Blau & Winkler, 2017).  
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Consequences of economic dependency  
Given the historic connection between domestic labor and dependency we should assume 
that women’s economic independence is less than standard labor force statistics suggest. A vast 
amount of research (England & Farkas, 1986; Lundberg & Pollack, 1996; Oppenheimer, 1997; 
Smock, Manning, & Gupta, 1999; Sorensen & McLanahan, 1987; Waldfogel, 1997) suggests 
that having fewer financial resources of one’s own deprives people of bargaining power, both in 
the decision to marry and in their relationships more generally. Moreover, it greatly affects 
people’s agency because of the economic vulnerability it inflicts on people in the event of 
marital or partnership dissolution (Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013; Hobson, 2011; Sen, 1992). 
The greater the dependency, the more important maintaining the marriage is for women than for 
men. This inequality enables men to negotiate solutions more favorable to themselves in terms of 
family expenditure or the amount of domestic tasks they perform (Blau, Ferber & Winkler, 
2002). 
Prior to the gender revolution of the mid-20th century and the subsequent flocking of 
women into the workforce, feminist writers and activists pointed out the inherent flaw in the 
equal trade argument; whatever the monetary value of domestic labor may be, women are not 
getting it. Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1898) argued that women that dedicate themselves to taking 
care of the home are still economically dependent on their male partners. They are not their 
husband’s business partner nor an employee. Women make a living by marriage, not by the work 
they do, and so man becomes their economic environment.  
Women’s labor within the household has a genuine economic value. Household labor 
produces goods and services that are consumed and thus clearly affect household well-being. 
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Household production enables men to obtain more earnings, income, and wealth than they 
otherwise would (Folbre, 2012).  
But women’s domestic labor is neither given nor taken as a factor in economic exchange. 
Rather, it is seen as women’s duty to do this work and their economic status bears no relation to 
their domestic labor.   
Perkins Gilman (1898) argued that if we take the “equal trade” ground to its logical 
extreme, wives as earners through domestic service are entitled to the wages of cooks, 
housecleaners, seamstresses, and caregivers. The wife of a poor man who works hard in her 
house receives less “pay” than the wife of a rich man who is performing the same tasks. 
Likewise, a childless wife has as much money as the mother of many and the inefficient mother 
is no less provided for than the efficient one. If marriage were an equal trade agreement and 
women were actually paid wages for domestic work (by their husbands) these wages would 
reduce the spending money of the rich man’s wife and put it out of the power of the poor man to 
support a wife at all (Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 1898).  
McLanahan, Casper, and Sorensen (1992) explored women’s roles in eight industrialized 
countries and found that women’s roles have changed dramatically. They found that although 
working outside the home was still seen as nontraditional for women, in six out of the eight 
countries they examined, most women were in the workforce. When McLanahan et al. focused 
on married women with children, they found that in some countries a greater number of women 
occupy the role of the employed mother than the role of mother and homemaker. They conclude 
that those women are traditional in the sense that they are getting married and having children 
but the fact that they are also working for pay indicates a move toward greater independence.  
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Women’s roles are changing. In most countries included in this dissertation women who 
are married and have children are more likely to combine motherhood with employment than to 
dedicate themselves exclusively to homemaking, Table 2.1. Only in Italy are mothers as likely to 
stay home as they are to work outside the home, though in Greece and Poland the percentage of 
mothers who work for pay or stay at home is similar. However, despite these changing roles 
women have not been able to free themselves from domestic labor. And what was true in the 
mid-20th century is true today: work that is done in the home continues to go unremunerated. 
Table 2. 1 Percent of women that are employed mothers and stay at home mothers. 
 
Employed mother Stay at home mother 
Australia .17 .08 
Austria .19 .05 
Canada .20 .04 
Czech Republic .19 .06 
Germany .16 .04 
Denmark .19 .02 
Estonia .15 .03 
France .16 .04 
Finland .17 .02 
Greece .15 .15 
Iceland .20 .01 
Ireland .17 .10 
Italy .14 .12 
Luxembourg .20 .07 
Netherlands .20 .04 
Norway .16 .02 
Poland .18 .14 
Slovenia .17 .03 
Slovakia .21 .07 
Spain .18 .08 
UK .18 .07 




Julie Brines (1994) asks in her research why housework remains women’s work.8 She 
tests the economic dependency model which states that household labor is provided in return for 
economic support and what she finds is that wives, indeed, respond in ways consistent with the 
dependency model: the less dependent on their husbands for economic support the less 
housework they do. But, interestingly, Brines found that this rational exchange theory does not 
hold for men. Dependent husbands do less housework in the home than husbands that are not 
dependent. And the more dependent they are, the less housework they do. The reason for this, 
according to Brines, is that men that rely on their wives for economic support respond to that 
dependency by avoiding housework to reclaim their constitutive masculinity. The cultural 
framing of manhood as an accomplishment (to become a man) makes claims to masculinity more 
precarious than those of natural womanhood. Therefore, men who are dependent feel the need to 
prove their masculinity by not doing unpaid housework, whereas breadwinner wives’ do not feel 
as strong a need to prove their womanhood by continuing to do most of the unpaid work in the 
home. This pattern, according to Brines, is particularly true for men in low-income households. 
But if breadwinner wives are doing less housework in the home, and dependent men are also 
doing less, who is picking up the slack?  
Greenstein (2000) challenged Brines’ findings and argued that perhaps in households 
where the wife is the primary breadwinner, a greater share of labor market earnings is directed 
toward purchasing household goods and services in the market, thus resulting in fewer total 
hours of housework performed in households with breadwinner wives and dependent husbands. 
He replicated Brines’ research but used a distributional (as opposed to absolute) measure of 
housework and found that when using proportion of household labor performed, both husbands 
                                                          
8 Her measures of unpaid work included only housework, not child rearing.  
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and wives have a nonlinear relationship with economic dependence. The effect of economic 
dependence of wives on the distributional measure of housework also seems to be a gender 
display. As wives become less economically dependent on their husbands, the proportion of 
housework declines, reaching its minimum just past the midway point (where they are earning 
approximately the same). From that point, the proportion of housework performed by wives 
again turns upward. Hence, breadwinner wives are doing more housework then predicted under 
an economic dependency model, but dependent husbands are doing less.    
In 2010, Leslie McCall directly addressed the question of dependency when she 
researched class inequality among women by calculating the independence correlation: the 
extent to which women’s own annual earnings correlate to their household income. The 
independence correlation is a measure of where women fall in the earning distribution of all 
women relative to where they fall in the income distribution of all families. In defining the 
underlying logic of the independence correlation, McCall (2010) writes: “If the association is 
high - that is, if one’s position in the distribution of earnings is relatively similar to one’s position 
in the distribution of family income - then we can conclude that family-specific factors are 
relatively unimportant and that the variances of earnings and family income distributions are 
similar.”  
Fifty years after the birth of the second wave, McCall (2010) found that women in the 
United States have not gained parity with men. While she finds that women’s independence from 
sources other than their own earnings have more than doubled, American women remain 
dependent on their partners’ earnings in a way that men simply do not. Measuring women’s 
contribution to and reliance upon family income, McCall notes that American women contribute 
less to, and are more reliant upon, family income than are their husbands. This seems to indicate 
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that the ‘gender revolution’ of second-wave feminism is indeed, at least for women in America, 
incomplete (McCall, 2010). 
Thus, being active in the labor market and even having higher earnings than your 
husband does not seem to free women from the burden of being responsible for unpaid domestic 
labor. These results suggest that the division of labor among couples is not as straightforward as 
quid pro quo. Gender ideology still plays an important role and one can therefore assume that in 
countries where there are policies in place that encourage men to partake in housework and the 
care of their children there might be more equality among men and women simply because it is 
more culturally acceptable to be equal.  
Simone de Beauvoir (1989) said that while it is important for women to be permitted to 
participate in employment, it is more important for women to be integrated into the “totality of 
human reality” to become a true partner to man. To achieve this, she argued, the nuclear family 
must be reconfigured. Social stigmas against unwed mothers must be lifted, abortions made legal 
so women can take charge of their own pregnancies, control their own lives, and achieve 
liberation and enter the workplace as an equal to men. If not, women will have a hard time 
reconciling their reproductive capacity with their productive capacity. Likewise, Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman called for a restructuring of society to free women from the burden of domestic 
duties. She envisioned domestic work as being like any other kind of work, a public, social 
activity no different from shoemaking or ship building. In her fiction she imagines a range of 
institutions that overcome the isolation of women and children, such as communal kitchens, 
child care centers, and city plans that foster camaraderie rather than withdrawal. 
While much has changed for women and families since the writings of de Beauvoir and 
Perkins Gilman modern, western societies are still structured in a way that makes it hard for 
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women to reconcile their reproductive and productive capacity. Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1898) 
argued that until women could build careers and support themselves independent of anyone else, 
they would continue to be suppressed in the household and confined to domestic tasks. But, as it 
turns out, building careers is not enough to free women from domestic labor. Therefore the 
measure of economic dependence employed in this dissertation offers a better perspective on 
women’s economic well-being than traditional labor statistics. 
 For women, especially mothers, to be able to partake in the paid labor market they need 
to either work more total work hours (paid plus unpaid work) or pay someone else to do the 
unpaid work for them. Of course, not all women can afford that and thus gender equality 
becomes a class issue.  
As stated earlier most of the countries in this study have more mothers that work outside 
the home than not. This ratio of homemakers to employed mothers changes when we stop 
looking at women as one homogenous group and disagregate them by class. A class analysis of 
women‘s roles reveals that mothers who have lower levels of education are more likely to stay at 
home than mothers who have higher levels of education (Table 1 in Appendix). Moreover, in 
France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia,  UK and the United States women who have not 
completed secondary education are more likely to be homemakers9 than to work outside the 
house.  
The country differences observed in the number of mothers that work outside the home is 
likely, in part, caused by structural differences in these countries. As we will see, while most of 
                                                          
9 For the purpose of this dissertation “homemaker” refers to a woman without employment (using the categorical 
variable emp where 1=employed and 0=not employed). Of course, we cannot know if these women are actually 
doing the work of homemaking, but here I make that inference based on their employment situation.  
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the countries in this study have some kind of policies in place that are aimed at assisting people 
in balancing paid work and family life, they differ greatly in strategy and generosity. 
 
Work-family reconciliation policies: a cross-national perspective 
The gender revolution did not play out the same way across all Western countries, with 
little global consensus on whether the emphasis should be on the labor market or the home as a 
site for women’s emancipation. Throughout its history, feminism has struggled with the 
connection between the domestic oppression of women and the economic oppression of women 
in the workplace (or, as Marx succinctly put it in his materialist jargon, the tension between 
social and economic reproduction). Each strand of feminism has confronted the connection 
between domestic and workplace patriarchy in its own way.  
This lack of consensus about whether the emphasis should be on the labor market or the 
home becomes very noticeable when researching different work-family reconciliation strategies. 
Work-family reconciliation policies can historically be divided into two main approaches. The 
first approach, sometimes referred to as the “care perspective” is a conservative one that aims at 
providing women with sufficient remuneration, such as a child allowance, that might allow them 
to forgo market work and dedicate themselves to staying at home and providing care. The 
alternative approach is to move the caregiving out of the home and thus level the playing field 
for women to compete with men in the labor force. This perspective, sometimes referred to as the 
“sameness” or “employment” perspective, has been advocated by many liberal feminists (see 
Gornick and Meyers, 2003 for a description of this perspective). In essence, one approach asks 
us to sacrifice gender equality for the sake of children’s well-being, and the other to sacrifice the 
interest of children for the sake of gender equality. 
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For American second-wave feminists, particularly those of the liberal variety, the 
emancipation of women could be won only if women were first given equal opportunities in the 
workplace (Eisenstein, 2009: Federici, 2012: Tong & Fernandes Botts, 2017). According to this 
tradition, the women’s employment perspective, if women can achieve parity with men in the 
workplace, they will experience a growth of agency that will ripple throughout society, loosening 
the hold of patriarchy across all social spheres. Thus, the goal of the state should be to support 
women’s employment opportunities and achievements. Consequently, feminist groups of the 
American second-wave fought for legislative protections of women in the workplace in the 
hopes of sparking a gender revolution that would conclude in the total emancipation of women 
(Ray, Gornick, & Schmitt, 2010; Tong & Fernandes Botts, 2017).  
Indeed, two recently published popular books illustrate the legacy and enduring influence 
of American second wave feminism on public opinion and debate within that country. In her 
contentious and bestselling 2013 book, Lean In, business executive Sheryl Sandberg addresses 
the challenges and opportunities women face in getting to the top of the corporate ladder.  While 
the book does address obstacles unique to women, it does so in a uniquely American way, 
developing a feminism at the nexus of individualism and corporate achievement. Published a 
year earlier, Hanna Rosin’s bestselling The End of Men and the Rise of Women prophesied 
women’s eventual economic dominance in a bold new economic world characterized by service 
and care work.  Though popular, rather than academic or activist in nature, both texts are 
representative of American debates surrounding gender equality since the dawn of second wave 
feminism, debates which have largely been focused on the workplace.  
Meanwhile, the gender revolution in many parts of Europe looked very different. While 
American gender reforms of the mid-century and later targeted the workplace, largely in line 
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with the liberal welfare model of social mobility through equal access to the marketplace, 
reforms in the Nordic countries contoured to the existing socialist model of welfare, instituting 
sweeping reforms that targeted both household and working conditions. In the Nordic countries, 
emphasis was placed on work-family reconciliation policy implementation resulting in universal 
child care and extensive paid leave for new parents. This perspective emphasized that the role of 
the state should be to grant women the “right to time for care” (Ray, Gornick ,& Schmitt, 2010). 
Today the Nordic countries have among the highest per capita GDPs in the world, lowest gender-
wage gaps, highest employment rates for women, and highest educational levels for both men 
and women (Brady, 2009).  
As stated earlier, McCall (2010) found that US’ women’s economic well-being is still 
largely dependent on their total family income. Is this also true in other Western countries today, 
where second-wave feminists might have articulated their critiques outside of the liberal feminist 
narrative, and mobilized in widely disparate political contexts?  
The vast literature on welfare states and family policy points to the extensive differences 
among countries in terms of the modes of state intervention and the generosity of benefits. These 
differences undoubtedly explain a variety of gendered outcomes (Esping Andersen, 1990; Korpi, 
2000; Mandel & Semyonov, 2006; Blau & Winkler, 2017). Sorting countries into different 
welfare regimes, based on different patterns of state intervention is not a straightforward 
exercise. The most widely applied framework is that developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) 
where he outlines three main types of welfare states based on three principles: de-
commodification (the extent to which a person’s well-being is dependent upon the market), 
social stratification (the role of the state in maintaining or breaking down social stratification), 
and the private-public mix (the relative role of the state, the family, and the market in social 
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provision). The operationalization of these principles leads to the division of welfare states into 
three ideal types (Bambra, 2004).   
The three types of welfare states according to Esping-Andersen’s typology are liberal 
(anglophone countries), conservative (continental Europe plus Japan), and social democratic (the 
Nordic countries). The Nordic countries’ social democratic welfare state is characterized by a 
dual earner regime that promotes gender equality through universal benefits to employed 
mothers, through public employment and social services. The conservative and liberal countries 
however, have weakly developed family policies. The conservative countries are more 
“familistic” and rely on family solutions while the liberal countries are market-oriented and rely 
on the private market to supply care services (Esping-Andersen, 1990).  
These different solutions have a great effect on women’s economic activity and 
consequently their economic dependence. Women’s labor force participation tends to be higher 
in the social democratic countries where child care is publicly funded while the conservative 
countries have the lowest levels of women’s labor force participation due to their reliance on 
families as the major caregivers (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 2013; 
Mandel, 2011).  
Since Esping-Andersen’s work came out in the nineties, many researchers have 
reassessed these clusters. Some scholars have argued that the conservative cluster should be 
divided in two: continental and southern. These scholars argue that when the southern countries 
of Europe (Spain, Greece, Portugal) are added to the analysis a fourth world of welfare emerges 
in which Italy can also be placed. The southern European welfare state is described as 
“rudimentary” because of their fragmented system of social provisions and heavy reliance on 
family and the voluntary sector (Bambra, 2007; Bonoli, 1997; Ferrera, 1996; Leibfried, 1992).  
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Moreover, feminist scholars argued that de-commodification—the process of protecting 
workers and their families from the unpredictability of the labor market, a concept popularized 
by Esping-Andersen—did not apply to many women’s social and economic situation. As a 
group, women were not sufficiently commodified to benefit from loosening of their 
commodification status: thus, de-commodification is an incomplete framework for assessing 
welfare state variation. Julia O’Connor (1996) suggested supplementing de-commodification 
with the concept of personal autonomy and Ann Orloff (1993) argued that the extent to which 
states provide access to paid work and enhance women’s autonomy to form autonomous 
households should constitute new dimensions of welfare state variations. When gender is added 
to the cluster analysis in such a way, the original Esping-Andersen clusters have held up for the 
most part. The main divergence seems to be within the conservative cluster. Gornick, Meyers, 
and Ross (1997) examined policies that affect women’s employment and found that the 
conservative countries showed little commonality (with policy efforts in Belgium and France 
aligning more with the Nordic countries). Additionally, their results found that Norway diverged 
from the rest of the Nordic countries and Canada pulled away from the other liberal countries 
(Gornick, Meyers, Ross, 1997).  
Korpi (2000) used the framework of de-familization (government spending meant to 
support an individual’s independence from family—as opposed to work, which is what de-
commodification refers to) to analyze the effect welfare states have on class and gender 
inequality. He distinguished between three types of policy design. First, he identified policies in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden which have characteristics that offer “dual earner 
support”. This indicates the extent to which policies encourage women’s continuous labor force 
participation, enable women and men to combine parenthood with paid work, and attempt to 
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redistribute care work within the family. In France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the Netherlands 
he identified institutions for “general family support”. Those institutions give support to the 
nuclear family presuming that wives have the primary responsibility for reproductive work 
within the family and only enter paid work on a temporary or part-time basis. Finally, Korpi 
finds that countries where neither of the two policy dimensions are well developed can be 
assumed to have chosen to allow market forces to shape gender relations, leaving individuals to 
work out their own solutions within the context of their market and/or family resources. These 
market-oriented countries, in Korpi’s analysis, are Australia, Japan, UK and US. 
Finally, some scholars have extended Esping-Andersen’s framework (which only 
includes 18 OECD countries) to include central and eastern European countries. At the end of the 
communist era Central and Eastern European women found themselves in a historically unique 
situation. They had the highest employment levels in the world (followed closely by the Nordic 
countries) but, according to time-use surveys, division of labor in the home was still traditional. 
During the socialist era they had been encouraged to work full-time and as a result women’s 
employment rates were almost as high as men’s at the time.  
However, unlike in the social democratic countries, no efforts were being made to 
encourage men to partake in household labor. Thus, the double burden of paid and unpaid work 
was exceptionally onerous for women in these countries. Seeing that almost all women worked 
for pay during the communist era and a developed system of child care was already in place it 
seems like the former Soviet countries could have easily followed the Swedish path of taking 
measures to encourage men to share in child-rearing to make it easier for women to balance paid 
work and family life. However, instead of continuing down a path of de-familization and 
supporting gender equality in the workplace and the home, the former Soviet countries have all 
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tried to reintroduce the traditional familization regime by inducing women to return to the home. 
Indeed, the past few decades brought intense changes to this regime, with cuts in cash benefits to 
mothers, trimming of child care services, and the emergence of unemployment where the drop in 
labor force participation was especially sharp for women (Saxonberg & Sirovatka, 2006; Scharle, 
2007). 
As imperfect as the welfare clustering framework may be, I rely on it in this dissertation 
to organize my work and fit it in with existing literature. However, I divide countries into five 
clusters (and not three) in my analysis: Anglophone countries (market oriented), Nordic 
countries (social democratic), then I separate the conservative countries in two—Continental 
countries and Southern European Countries— and add Eastern European countries (post-
communist).  
As stated earlier I use “work-family reconciliation policies” as an umbrella term for all 
those policies that are meant to support adults who are balancing parenthood and employment. 
These policies may or may not enhance gender equality in paid and unpaid work; leave policies, 
for example, might increase occupational segregation by gender while universal child care will 
increase women’s employment rates. Some scholars have suggested that the reforms undertaken 
in Nordic countries produce greater equality but less mobility, effectively thickening the so-
called “glass ceiling”. Mandel and Semyonov (2006) call this the “welfare paradox”. They found 
that countries with developed work-family reconciliation policies tend to have a high 
concentration of women in female-typed occupations and low female representation in high-
status managerial occupations. Thus, they argue that policies that allow women long leaves from 
paid work or reduced working hours impede women from competing successfully with men in 
the labor market. It decreases their commitment to paid work and increases employer statistical 
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discrimination. This in turn lowers women’s probabilities to reach top jobs and high earnings. 
Thus, for work-family reconciliation policies to increase gender equality, in addition to 
alleviating women’s double burden of paid work and unpaid work in the home, and to ensure 
that parents get to care for their children at least for the first months of their lives, they must be 
very carefully designed. 
Gornick and Meyers (2003) argued that current debates in the US and other high-income 
countries about work and family center around three distinct conversations. The first 
conversation centers on child-wellbeing, particularly in regard to maternal employment where 
parent’s time away from their children comprises the child’s early development. The second 
conversation is about work/family conflict, where it focuses on the double shift employed 
parents (mostly mothers) need to take on in dealing with the market and their home. The final 
conversation encompasses broader concerns of gender equality, particularly in so far as women 
still trail men in the labor market and disproportionately carry the burden of the unpaid work that 
takes place in the home. Each of these conversations advances a policy solution that implies a 
tradeoff between gender equality in employment and parental caregiving time available to 
children. This is mainly because these perspectives all assume that fathers will be employed full 
time throughout their lives (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; 2009).  
However, Gornick and Meyers argue that the interests of men, women, and children are 
not fundamentally at odds with one another. Rather the interest of each is at odds with 
contemporary workplace practices and social policies that have failed to respond to changing 
economic and social realities. Drawing on European feminist scholarship, Gornick and Meyers 
(2003; 2009) propose an alternative program they call the dual-earner-dual-caregiver approach. 
Adopting this approach, both parents would spend considerable time at home with their infants 
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but rely on substitute care as their children grow. Parenting is de-gendered and fathers and 
mothers divide the responsibility of earning and caring equally between them. This can only be 
achieved with help from employers, the government and society more broadly.  
To enable a dual-earner-dual-caregiver society Gornick and Meyers propose a policy 
package that includes: 1) family leave policies: the government would have to provide leave for 
both parents to care for infants and young children. Leaves would have to be paid and grant job 
protection for mothers and fathers as well as substantial incentives for men’s take up.  Gender 
equalizing leave policies would have a few key features. First, all employed parents would be 
granted the right to six months of paid leave with job protection. Gornick and Meyers suggest 
capping the per-person leave at six months because of evidence that suggests that that leave 
length is advantageous, and not harmful, to women’s labor force attachment. Second, each parent 
would have his or her own non-transferable leave. This means that one parent would not be able 
to transfer their leave to their partner. This arrangement is believed to increase incentives for 
fathers’ participation. Third, employees would receive 100 percent wage replacement during 
their leave. Fourth, flexibility in leave entitlements would allow parents to take their leave full-
time for 6 months or part-time and stretch it across a longer duration. Finally, mothers and 
fathers would have the right to some paid time off to attend to short-term needs that happen 
throughout their children’s lives.   
2)  Working time measures: for women to shift more of their hours to market work and 
fathers to shift more of their hours to work in the home, there would need to be substantial 
changes to employment time (this is particularly true for fathers). Working time regulations that 
increase parents’ options for high-quality reduced hour work would include limiting weekly 
employment hours (and options for flexible scheduling), assuring workers a significant number 
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of paid days off per year, and grant part-time workers with pay and benefit parity compared to 
full-time workers in similar work.  
3) Finally, Gornick and Meyers’ proposed policy package includes high-quality publicly 
funded child care as the child grows. Government would establish entitlements to early 
childhood education and care at the national level. Thus, the onus of assuring the availability of 
care would fall on government. The government would also finance early childhood education 
and care at the national level. This is crucial for equalizing both access to care and the burden of 
out-of-pocket costs for families (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; 2009). 
Gornick and Meyers’ policy blueprint supports gender equality both in parenthood and 
employment. While their policy package is innovative in the American context, all the policies 
themselves have been implemented in many countries in the West to varying degrees. 
 
Current research: research questions and expected findings 
The goal of this dissertation is not to empirically measure trends or changes since the 
dawn of second wave feminism but rather to provide a snapshot of how contemporary welfare 
state interventions are affecting women’s economic independence. The gender revolution 
remains unfinished. In all Western countries women, far more than men, juggle dual 
responsibilities in the home and the workplace (Hochschild, 1989: Folbre, 2001: Folbre, 2012). 
Women are still less likely to do full-time work, more likely to be employed in lower paying 
jobs, and less likely to advance in their careers. Research suggests that a variety of demographic 
factors might affect women’s economic dependence. These include level of education, marital 
status, motherhood, and family size. Likewise, there is a vast literature on the institutional 
determinants of women’s economic well-being. However, few have assessed these micro-and 
macro-factors together. As a result, the debate on the topic of women’s employment has often 
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been described as polarized (Nieuwenhuis, 2014). Not considering both demographic and 
institutional factors limits these studies in numerous ways.  
As stated in Chapter 1, I expect to find that in countries where the implementation of 
social policies was aimed not only at strengthening either women’s ties to the labor market or the 
home, but rather to reconcile employment and family life there has been more success in 
increasing women’s independence. Guided by Gornick and Meyers’ framework, I examine the 
effect of some of the policies that they suggest can support gender egalitarianism in parenthood 
and employment: paid leave for mothers and fathers, publicly funded child care, and work time 
regulation. I also extend their analyses to a larger group of countries and a later point in time. 
The main research question in this dissertation is: are women in countries that come closest to 
fulfilling the dual-earner/dual-caregiver approach less dependent on their male partners’ 
earnings?  
If the goal of this dissertation is to assess the legacy of the gender revolution across the 
developed world, it cannot simply compare country outcomes. It must also look at the 
distributive successes of the gender revolution across the socioeconomic spectrum within each 
sampled country. Indeed, as stated earlier an enduring concern of feminist scholars and activists 
is the extent to which the successes of American second-wave reforms served to enhance the 
privileges of already well-off women. Thus, the main goal of this dissertation is to assess the 
stratification of women across the Western world. Leslie McCall (2010) found that women’s 
financial contributions to family income have grown dramatically even though men’s 
contributions continue to dominate family income. It is however unclear whether women’s 
contributions to household income have grown at even rates across the class spectrum.  
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This research attempts to respond to this lacuna and assess the effect of work-family 
reconciliation policies on women of different socio-economic statuses. I assess socio-economic 
status or class with level of education on one hand and household income on the other hand. I 
expect to find that class differences in dependency might be stronger in the context of weak 
public support of families. There are a few main reasons for this. First, in the absence of work-
family reconciliation policies there is a greater ability among high earners to outsource or use 
market substitutes. People with high family income can hire a third party to care for their 
children; they can even hire a third party to clean their home and they can more easily eat out at 
restaurants or buy prepared meals. 
Women in families with high income are therefore less restricted by household duties and 
can more easily compete with men in the labor force. This, in turn, makes them less dependent 
economically on their male partners. This pattern is further exacerbated by the fact that recent 
research has shown that less educated mothers constitute the growing number of stay at home 
mothers (Blau & Winkler, 2017; Cohn, Livingston, & Wang, 2014). This is true for all countries 
included here except Estonia, where women of all levels of education are equally unlikely to be 
homemakers, and the Nordic countries, where women with low education are more likely to be 
homemaker but only by a very small percentage (Table 1. Appendix).   
Second, research has found that there is greater child care investment among college 
educated fathers (Sullivan, Billari, & Altintas, 2014). Guryan, Hurst and Kearney (2008) found 
that across a large number of economically advanced countries both highly educated mothers and 
fathers spend more time directly engaged with their children than less educated parents. Since 
more highly educated parents have a higher opportunity cost of time this is in some ways counter 
to what would be expected based on economic theory. However, these couples have the financial 
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resources to make time for their children by outsourcing household tasks. More educated fathers 
(and mothers) are also more likely to have jobs that are more flexible (Ramey & Ramey, 2010). 
College educated women also have greater leverage in negotiating household tasks and 
research finds that they tend to do less housework than women with less education, while more 
educated men do more housework than less educated men (Brines, 1994; Greenstein, 2000). 
Overall, in lower income families men and women tend to be less egalitarian. The burden of 
unpaid domestic labor is almost entirely on the shoulders of women, making it difficult for them 
to participate fully in the paid labor market. That, in turn, makes them more likely to be 
economically dependent on their male partners than are women of higher socio-economic status.  
In this dissertation I assess women’s economic dependence by class. Measuring women’s 
economic dependence, rather than exclusively observing their labor force participation and 
earnings, will ultimately develop a broader understanding of women’s economic well-being 
within a country, both relative to men and to other women. Focusing solely on labor market 
statistics provides us with a unidimensional picture of gender inequality. Gender equality is not 
captured by mere participation in the labor market, nor are senior, high paying positions the sole 
metric for evaluating women’s autonomy. At a much more fundamental level, gender equality 
means women are less dependent on their male partners for their economic well-being. It means 
that all women can be autonomous regardless of their family income, educational level, or 
whether they have children or not.  
It is important to note, however, that independence does not necessarily equal more 
economic well-being. Women can be less dependent for example because they are single and 
have only their own earnings to rely on. Within the framework of this research independence is 
treated as desirable regardless of the reasons behind the independence. The reason for that is that 
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a woman who is poor but economically independent is better off than a woman who is poor and 
economically dependent on her male partner who might leave at any given time (making her 
situation even worse). I argue that in comparison with, for example, homemakers, a woman who 
is in the paid labor market has more capabilities to govern her own life. 
As stated, the goal of this dissertation is to assess the effects of both socio-demographic 
and institutional factors on women’s economic dependence across the class spectrum. After 
examining the effect of socio-demographic factors and class on women’s employment outcomes 
and economic dependence in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, I explore the institutional factors in 
Chapter 6 while holding socio-demographic factors constant. 
In the world of work-family policy research, it is well-known that measuring these 
policies is a complicated exercise.  There are many data sources, and, within each, there are 
multiple metrics and measures that can be used.10 Gornick and Meyers themselves state that for 
the policies to have their intended effect they need to be very carefully designed. To encourage 
take-up by fathers, paternity leave must be well paid: simply providing fathers with an individual 
leave entitlement is not enough. Many OECD countries already offer fathers unpaid parental 
leave, but—given the potential loss of income—take-up is usually low. Not surprisingly, 
research suggests that fathers’ use of leave is highest when leave is not just paid but well paid—
around half or more of previous earnings. In this dissertation I use an indicator of the full-rate 
equivalent (FRE) paternity leave (that is the length of the paid leave in weeks if it were paid at 
100% of previous earnings) and expect to find that in countries that have FRE paid leave 
exclusively for fathers (which means that they cannot transfer the leave to their female partners), 
women’s own education will have a less pronounced effect on economic dependence among 
                                                          
10 More detailed description on the indicators of work-family reconciliation policies used in this dissertation are 
provided in Chapter 3, Data and Methods.  
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women. Paid leave that is exclusively for fathers11 will get fathers more involved in the 
responsibilities of the home which in turn allows women to be more engaged with the paid labor 
market and subsequently less economically dependent.   
Likewise, while job-protected leave available to mothers can increase women’s labor 
force participation in a country, leave that is too long can, as stated before, increase the risk of 
statistical discrimination. This can impede women from reaching top positions and top earnings 
and thus can increase their dependence on men - even though the women are active in the labor 
market. The indicator I use for maternity leave is therefore paid leave available to mothers in 
full-rate equivalent and no longer than 40 weeks. In that index I include both paid maternity and 
parental leave since women are more likely than men to use all the paid leave that is available to 
them. (I refer to this indicator from now on as maternity leave or FRE maternity leave).  
I use a combined index to assess the effect of child care. I expect to find that in countries 
with more child care support for families, the effect of class on women’s economic dependence 
will be less pronounced. Again, this is because in the absence of generous work-family policy 
women are reduced to either outsourcing or relying on extended family to be able to juggle 
work-and family responsibilities. With affordable child care available women of lower income 
class are less likely to be forced to work part-time or fall out of the labor market all together.  
I use a combined index to measure working time regulations. I expect to find that in 
countries where there is legislation regarding annual leave and rest days the effect of class on 
women’s economic independence will be less pronounced. The reasons are twofold: first, in 
countries that have shorter hours, more leave, and/or guaranteed rest days men are more likely to 
                                                          
11 As Gornick and Meyers suggest paternity leave needs to be non-transferable to encourage take-up by fathers. 
When fathers have the right to paid leave but can transfer some or all of it to their partners they are more likely to do 
so than if the family loses the paternity leave if the father does not use it.  
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partake in domestic labor. Second, when countries put a ceiling on everybody’s hours it has a de 
facto gender egalitarian effect because it primarily limits the hours that men work and 
subsequently reduces their earnings. This in turn brings men’s earnings closer to women’s 
earnings. The combined index used here does not measure maximum hours, but it does include 
guaranteed days of rest and annual leave.  
To assess whether these policies moderate the effect of class status on women’s 
economic dependence I employ a multilevel model in Chapter 6. On the individual level, I 
evaluate the influence of socio-demographic variables such as age and family size, as well as 
education (i.e., social class), on women’s relative earnings (i.e., economic dependence). I expect 
to find a significant direct relationship between education and relative earnings, where an 
increase in educational attainment is associated with an increase in relative earnings. However, 
my expectation is that the relationship between women’s education and relative earnings is 
moderated by work-family reconciliation policy. In other words, I expect to find that in countries 
with more generous work-family reconciliation policies in place, the association between 
education and relative earnings will be weaker than in countries that have less generous work-
family reconciliation policies. Thus, I next introduce the work-family reconciliation policies (at 
the country level) and test for a cross-level interaction effect between education and work-family 
reconciliation policy on women’s relative earnings.  
To reiterate: I expect to find more class inequality among women in countries with 
weaker work-family reconciliation policies. In these countries, women who have completed 
higher levels of education will show higher earnings relative to the median man compared with 
less educated women. In contrast, countries with more generous work-family reconciliation 
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policies will feature a smaller gap in the predicted relative earnings between women of different 
educational attainment.  
The main research questions addressed in this dissertation are the following: What does 
women’s engagement in paid work look like in Western countries today? Is there a big 
difference in women’s engagement in paid work by class or by family type? Does this vary by 
country? How economically dependent are Western women on their male partners? Does the size 
of women’s share in couples’ joint income vary considerably cross-nationally? Does women’s 
degree of dependency vary by class? Does the relationship between class and dependency vary 
cross-nationally? And finally, what factors explain any cross-national variation we might find in 
women’s economic well-being relative to men’s? Is it individual-level factors such as age, or 
number of children? Or is it institutional factors in the form of extensive work-family 
reconciliation policies at the country level? Is the effect of class on women’s economic 





Chapter 3  
Data and Methods 
 
i.) Data  
I test my hypothesis that the relationship between class and women’s economic 
dependence is moderated by work-family reconciliation policies, against data measured at both 
the individual level and country level. The individual-level variables are obtained from the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) Database. LIS is the largest available database of harmonized 
income microdata collected from multiple countries over a period of decades. The data are 
harmonized into a common template to ensure comparability across countries. The LIS Database, 
which contains variables at the household- and person-level, focuses on income data, from both 
private and public sources. It also includes variables on household composition and other socio-
economic characteristics necessary for my individual-level analysis. I analyze 22 countries using 
the most recent data wave12 for each country ranging from 2010 to 2014.  
When using data for cross-national analysis it is desirable to include all countries for 
which pertinent data can be secured. I therefore include the following countries: Austria, 
Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. These countries were selected on 
the availability of detailed information on both demographic and labor market attributes. 
Furthermore, all of these industrialized Western countries experienced the gender revolution of 
the twentieth century although their responses to it varied immensely. 
                                                          
12 A LIS “wave” refers to the years on which the repeated cross sections are centered. For this dissertation I use 
Waves VIII and IX, which are centered on 2010 and 2014, respectively. 
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This dissertation uses individual-level data from LIS with country-level data from 
country comparative databases. These databases include: The OECD Family Database, The 
OECD Social Expenditure Database, and the ILO Database on Working Conditions Laws. 13 
 
ii.) Sample  
 The sample consists of working-age women and men across twenty-two countries. In 
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, to maximize comparability, I include prime-aged adults, 25-54 years 
old, who are either married or cohabiting. 14 Cross-national variation in the age at which young 
adults complete their education affects the employment rates and working hours of younger 
workers; to avoid capturing the effects of varied education patterns, I use the lower-end cutoff of 
25 for age. Likewise, the upper-end cutoff of 54 is used to net out the effects of cross-national 
variation in the age of retirement.  I use the entire sample of 25-54-year-old men and women, not 
just those that are cohabiting, for the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) where I assess women’s 
and men’s labor market engagement by class. In Chapters 5 and 6 I focus on the subset of 
women who have male partners15 and assess their dependence on those partners (Chapter 5) and 
their earnings relative to the median man in their country (Chapter 6).  
 
iii.) Variables  
                                                          
13 OECD stands for Office of Economic Cooperation and Development and ILO stands for International Labour 
Organization. 
14 The purpose of this dissertation is to examine women’s dependence on their male partners’ earnings. I will 
therefore only be looking at heterosexual couples. I include only couples that are living together; I exclude couples 
that are partnered but living apart. This is because when assessing women’s share of the couple’s income I need to 
assume that the family redistributes resources equally which is more likely to be true when they share a home. 
15 Thus, the analysis is limited to households where both the head and the partner are aged 25-54. For ease of 
narration I often refer to both of these persons as the household “head.” I am not exactly matching people to their 





In Chapter 4 I assess men’s and women’s engagement in paid work by class and family 
type. Employment rate is measured using a dichotomous variable which measures the percentage 
of people that were employed at the time of the survey, coded ‘0’ not employed and ‘1’ 
employed. Part-time work is a dichotomous variable measuring the percentage of employed 
people who work part time. A job is considered part time according to the country-specific 
definition of part-time employment (in the absence of which LIS uses the threshold of 30 weekly 
hours). Part-time work is coded ‘1’ if part-time and ‘0’ if full-time. Annual earnings is a 
continuous variable, provided in national currency. Parents of young children refers to men and 
women who are living with their own children aged 0-5; it is coded ‘0’ for not a parent and “1” 
for parents.  
Finally, labor market engagement is assessed by class. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, class is assessed using both a household-level income variable and level of 
education. Household income is measured using disposable household income16, which is a 
continuous variable that includes total market income from earnings and capital, plus private 
transfers, public social insurance, and social assistance; minus income taxes and social 
contributions paid by the household and the persons in the household. I assess class inequality in 
engagement in paid work by calculating women’s to men’s employment ratios, the percentage of 
(employed17) women working part-time, and annual median earnings for women in the top 
(20%), upper-middle (30%), lower-middle (30%), and bottom (20%) of the household income 
distribution.  
                                                          
16 This is what LIS refers to as DHI.  
17 I use the LIS variable emp which includes the self-employed.  
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I use education as a proxy for class by measuring women’s highest level of education, 
recoded for country comparability to 1=low (less than secondary education completed), 
2=medium (secondary education completed), and 3=high (tertiary education completed). For 
ease of reading, when referring to those levels of education in my results I use the terms high, 
medium and low. Descriptive results for education are in Table 3.1. The countries are ordered by 







Table 3. 1. Highest level of education completed by country and gender. 
  


































Canada 67 25 8 1 64 25 11 1 1.05 
Finland 56 37 7 2 42 45 13 4 1.10 
US 52 40 8 3 46 44 10 2 1.13 
Ireland 47 32 18 4 44 22 31 3 1.27 
Norway 47 33 16 5 36 45 16 8 1.31 
UK 46 44 9 6 41 48 10 5 1.07 
Iceland 44 34 21 7 33 47 19 10 1.03 
Australia 44 30 26 8 37 41 22 7 1.14 
Denmark 42 40 14 9 33 47 16 11 1.27 
Estonia 42 50 7 10 27 60 12 16 1.15 
Spain 41 21 37 11 34 23 42 9 0.91 
Netherlands 38 42 18 12 39 40 20 6 1.13 
France 35 41 24 13 30 46 24 12 1.57 
Slovenia 34 53 13 14 25 63 12 17 1.40 
Luxembourg 32 35 32 15 29 37 33 15 1.31 
Poland 31 62 7 16 21 72 7 18 1.29 
Greece 31 46 23 17 30 43 27 13 0.87 
Slovakia 27 68 5 18 19 76 5 20 2.16 
Germany 26 53 9 19 30 44 6 14 1.07 
Czech Republic 22 72 6 20 20 76 3 19 1.55 
Austria 18 66 16 21 18 74 8 21 1.72 





In Chapter 5 I assess women’s economic dependence on their male partners by measuring 
women’s share of couple´s earnings. This measure is constructed using “augmented earnings”, 
that is, a person-level indicator that includes each individual’s labor market earnings, plus their 
capital income, public transfers and private transfers—net of taxes.18 Women’s share is measured 
by dividing women’s own augmented earnings by the couple’s joint augmented earnings. This 
measure of dependency is then assessed by family type and class (measured with household 
income and education). 




For the multilevel analysis I assess the effect of education and work-family reconciliation 
policy on women’s independence by using each woman’s individual earnings divided by the 
median male earnings in her country as a dependent variable. The median male earnings are 
based on the subgroup I’m studying – partnered, working-age, persons.  As in Chapter 5 I use the 
more comprehensive augmented earnings measure and dived the augmented earnings of 
cohabiting women by the augmented earnings of the median cohabiting male. I then multiply the 
dependent variable, women’s relative earnings, by one hundred, for ease of interpretation. 
  
                                                          
18 Augmented earnings are parallel in concept to DHI (used for class). The difference is that augmented earnings are 
a person-level variable. I am studying the augmented earnings of only the two persons in the couple – in other 
words, the two heads of the household. The sum of “his” and “her” augmented earnings is not equal to DHI because 
any income source that cannot be disaggregated to the person-level is not included in augmented earnings. Also, 





Individual level predictor variables 
For the multilevel model, I introduce variables into the equation to control for cross-
national differences in wage-determining characteristics. Thus, the individual-level variables 
included in the analysis are those traditionally utilized in models predicting economic activity: 
age, education, and family characteristics. I allow for a nonlinear effect of age by including both 
age and age squared in the regression analysis. However, age was first grand mean centered. I 
chose grand mean centering over group mean centering as grand mean centering is more 
appropriate when the variable in question is a Level 1 control variable and not the main variable 
of interest (Enders & Tofighi, 2007). A dichotomous variable is coded ‘1’ for having children 
under the age of 6 in the household and ‘0’ for no children under age of 6. Also, I measure 
number of children on a scale ranging from zero (no child in household) to six (six or more 
children in household). Descriptive statistics for the individual level variables are found in table 
3.2. 
I measure educational attainment with two dichotomous variables, medium (secondary 
education completed) and low (less than secondary education completed), with high (tertiary 
education completed) as the baseline group. However, for the multilevel analysis I use a random 
effect within and between model (REWB) to estimate the within-country and between-countries 
effect of education (level 1) on women’s relative earnings.19 In order to assess both the within-
country and between-country effects of education in one model, I first generate the country-
specific mean of education. In other words, I calculate, within each country, the mean for each of 
the education dummies. These means will represent the between-country differences (i.e., group 
means will differ between clusters but not within them). The next step is to create the deviation 
                                                          




scores. Within each country, I subtract the mean for the country from each education dummy. 
This is also called group-mean centering. These deviations from the group mean represent the 







Table 3. 2. Descriptive statistics for individual level variables from regression analysis in Chapter 6 
 Female Age Children under 6 Number of Children N 
  Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD   
Australia .53 .50 38.34 8.74 .39 .49 1.29 1.19 14736 
Austria .51 .50 38.89 12.22 .18 .38 .94 1.10 5922 
Canada .51 .50 40.96 9.08 .21 .41 1.20 1.16 21735 
Czech Republic .51 .50 30.26 17.25 .14 .35 .75 1.00 10002 
Denmark .50 .50 41.21 9.01 .23 .42 1.13 1.10 67255 
Estonia .52 .50 38.82 14.41 .17 .38 1.05 1.14 6885 
Finland .49 .50 29.08 17.80 .15 .36 .80 1.24 17122 
France .52 .50 35.80 13.14 .24 .43 1.18 1.41 19372 
Germany .55 .50 39.24 9.73 .28 .45 1.40 1.27 15736 
Greece .50 .50 40.03 12.77 .19 .39 1.07 1.07 7209 
Iceland .50 .50 35.47 11.72 .24 .42 1.29 1.25 4065 
Ireland .53 .50 37.91 12.07 .30 .46 1.30 1.31 4562 
Italy .51 .50 44.57 7.46 .18 .38 1.32 1.04 4737 
Luxembourg .50 .50 32.31 14.91 .18 .39 .86 1.10 5603 
Netherlands .50 .50 38.41 11.06 .22 .42 1.20 1.18 9969 
Norway .49 .50 39.47 8.45 .26 .44 1.20 1.14 179102 
Poland .51 .50 37.19 14.90 .19 .40 1.04 1.12 51989 
Slovakia .53 .50 36.75 13.34 .15 .36 1.14 1.20 6934 
Slovenia .50 .50 43.06 8.28 .22 .41 1.48 1.02 3339 
Spain .51 .50 39.64 12.84 .19 .39 1.05 1.04 12614 
UK .52 .50 39.13 10.28 .25 .43 1.11 1.15 18212 
US .51 .50 36.69 12.65 .21 .41 1.12 1.26 64822 




Country-level predictor variables 
For the country level, I use a policy database constructed from a variety of secondary 
sources for each country. The work-family reconciliation policy indicators utilized in this 
dissertation are 1) paid leave assessed with 2 separate indicators: Full rate equivalent in weeks 
maternity leave and full rate equivalent in weeks paternity leave. 2) child care support and 3) 
working time regulations. Researchers often construct one multidimensional indicator to capture 
the effect of welfare state interventions on women’s economic well-being. These indicators 
combine policies such as the number of weeks of paid leave, and percentage of children enrolled 
in public child care into one index to capture the scope of family policies. However, one major 
criticism Mandel and Semyonov’s “welfare state paradox” research received was that they used a 
multidimensional index—the Welfare State Intervention Index—that does not distinguish 
between family policies with contrary effects on gender inequalities (Korpi, Ferrarini, & 
Englund, 2013). For this dissertation I have opted to estimate the effects of leave, child care, and 
working time regulations separately to capture the unique effect of each of these.  
1)Maternity and parental leave policy rules vary considerably in the countries under 
study, both in respect to the number of paid weeks and the level of financial support provided. 
Thus, for Maternity leave I calculate the full rate equivalent in weeks of total leave (maternity 
and parental leave) available to mothers. That is the length of the paid leave in weeks if it were 
paid at 100% of previous earnings. I include parental leave in this indicator because several 
researches have shown that in countries that offer leave exclusively for mothers, plus leave that 
either the mother or the father can take, mothers are more likely to use that entire leave (Arnalds, 
Eydal & Gíslason, 2015: Gornick & Meyers, 2003; 2009). Scholars have argued that the effect of 




weeks or less is too little for parents and infants to get the full benefits of physical recovery, 
bonding, and breastfeeding but, leave that is too long can backfire (Ruhm & Teauge, 1995). 
Gornick & Meyers (2009) suggest that leave is beneficial for women up to 6 months, but that 
leaves that are longer than 6 months might start having a negative effect on women’s economic 
well-being. Other scholars argue that leave should not be longer than nine months and that the 
“sweet spot” for leave length is somewhere between 6-9 months. After that time, it starts having 
a negative effect on women’s careers (Gornick & Meyers, 2009; Miller, 2019: Ruhm & Teauge, 
1995). 
To determine the length of leave that is good for women’s relative earnings I used single 
level OLS regression to estimate a micro-level model for each country separately.  I then plotted 
those results placing maternity leave on the x-axis and the effect of education on the y-axis. 
Those results gave the impression that the effect of maternity leave is indeed not linear but 
begins to have a modest negative effect after about 40 weeks (roughly 10 months). I therefore 
created a categorical variable where 1=13-40 weeks of maternity leave (the ideal) and 0=less 
than 13 weeks and more than 40 weeks.   
Paternity leave: To assess the importance of having paid paternity leave I calculate the 
full rate equivalent in weeks of total leave available exclusively to fathers.  Again, Gornick and 
Meyers (2003; 2009) argue that paternity leave needs to be non-transferable to make a real 
difference. If the leave can be transferred to the mother men are less likely to take any leave at 
all. I then create a categorical variable for paternity leave where 1= 1 or more weeks of FRE paid 
leave available exclusively for fathers with 0 FRE weeks available exclusively for fathers as the 




I chose not to combine these two indicators, maternity leave and paternity leave, into a 
combined leave index because I want to capture the effect of having leave that is exclusively for 
fathers compared with leave that is either just for mothers or both parents to share.  
  2) I measure work-time regulations with a combined index created out of two indicators: 
Annual leave and rest days. Data for work time regulations was retrieved from the ILO working 
conditions database which provides information on working time laws of over 100 countries. 
Annual leave is a continuous variable measuring the maximum days of paid annual leave 
available to workers. This measure ranges from 0 days to 28 days. The ILO derives data on 
annual leave from the minimum annual leave period that is mandated in the respective country 
for a worker in his first year of service. The ILO rounds the duration of leave provided by 
legislation into working days for a five-day work week. Where the law provides for a specific 
number of “calendar days”, the leave period is converted into the equivalent number of working 
days for the assumed five-day work week (ILO, 2013). 
Rest days is a continuous variable which measures how many hours per week workers are 
guaranteed for rest. The hours range from 0 to 48 hours a week. To render the variables 
comparable, each indicator was normalized by ranking and then the ranked values were added up 
to create a final combined index that ranges from 2 (minimal work-time regulation)- 
38(maximum work-regulation). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.8720 
3) I assess the effect of child care support with a combined index created out of three 
indicators: Child care enrollment is a variable measuring the participation rate of 0-2-year-old 
                                                          
20 There are a myriad of different techniques currently used in the literature to build composite indicators. I follow 






children in formal child care. (By 0-2, I refer to birth until the third birthday). This is a 
continuous variable ranging from 3% to 67%. Primary school enrollment measures the 
percentage of 3-5-year old children enrolled in pre-primary or primary school. This variable is 
continuous and has a range of 47% to a 100%. Enrollment rates are calculated by dividing the 
number of students of the same age group enrolled in care by the size of the population of that 
age group. These figures do not distinguish between full-time and part-time enrollment (OECD, 
n.d.).  
Using enrollment rates is the best proxy for assessing the availability of child care that is 
offered by the government. Some scholars have criticized the use of enrollment rates to capture 
government provisions and argue that enrollment rates are a poor measure of public policy 
because they are picking up parent’s preferences and behavior rather than government efforts. 
Thus, low enrollment rates in a country would not indicate that the government provides little, 
but rather that parents do not like to use public child care and instead choose an alternative such 
grandparent-provided care. However, it is widespread in the literature and widely reported in 
journalism that, in most countries, public child care programs are full, and with waiting lists. 
Therefore, enrollment rates do, in fact, proxy the level of government effort (Pieters, 2019; 
Olgeirsson, 2018). 
Measures on publicly-funded child care are, however, not easy to come by simply 
because public care is difficult to define. Measures for publicly-funded child care were not 
available for all the countries in this dissertation for the years that I am examining. I therefore 
use enrollment rates in formal care (which can include both public and private care). But, to get 
closer to assessing the availability of publicly funded care I also use an index which measures 




measured as a percentage of GDP and ranges from 0.1% to 1.84%. To render the three variables 
comparable each indicator was normalized by ranking and then the values were added up to 
create a final combined index of child care support that ranges from 6 (minimal child care 
support)- 60 (maximum child-care support). Cronbach’s alpha is 0.92. 
Descriptive results for the policy indicators, along with the outcome variable from 
Chapter 6, can be found in Table 3.3. Comparing each country’s score across the five policy 
measures, there is, for the most part, consistency in ranking. That is, countries that score high on 
one item tend to score high on the other items as well. Thus, the top-ranking countries are 
Iceland, Norway, Denmark, France and Luxembourg. Likewise, countries that are trailing the 
others and scoring low on one policy item tend to have low scores across the five policies. The 
countries that score the lowest across the five polices are the US, Canada, Australia, Ireland, 
Czech Republic, and Greece. The countries rank on the work-family reconciliation policies 
measured here roughly correspond with the country clusters presented in Chapters 4 and 5.  
When conducting a multilevel analysis, it is particularly important to think about scaling 
and centering of the variables, in order to make the intercept meaningful. Here, the continuous 
Level-2 explanatory variables—working time regulations and child care support — were 
centered before the analysis. More specifically, the variables were grand mean centered meaning 
that we assume that the mean is computed for the whole dataset and not individual countries. The 
only centering option for Level-2 variables is grand mean centering. The alternative to grand-
mean centering, which is group-mean centering, cannot be done for Level-2 variables because 
those variables are already measured at the country level, meaning the “group mean” would 




I use a random effect framework and run these regressions for women only which results 







Table 3. 3. Descriptive results for dependent variable and country level variables from Chapter 6. 
  
Dependent 
variable Country level variables 
















































Australia 64.07  0 0 33 53 .52 0 20  0 0 25 4 
Austria 59.88  51 7 19 83 .49 36 25  0 1 23 37 
Canada 71.71  28 0 24 47 .20 24 10  1 0 10 5 
Czech 
Republic 64.81  53 0 4 77 .45 35 20  0 0 15 13 
Denmark 82.61  27 1 67 96 1.36 35 25  1 1 60 27 
Estonia 82.46  85 2 23 90 .38 36 20  0 1 22 20 
Finland 79.70  42 6 28 74 1.11 35 25  0 1 34 27 
France 75.88  16 2 48 100 1.27 24 25  1 1 59 20 
Germany 53.72  43 6 29 94 .58 35 20  0 1 39 13 
Greece 53.48  23 0 17 47 .10 24 20  1 0 6 6 
Iceland 66.70  21 10 56 96 1.84 24 24  1 1 60 19 
Ireland 63.30  9 0 30 80 .52 35 20  0 0 30 13 
Italy 45.74  25 0 24 95 .54 24 20  1 0 36 6 
Luxembourg 65.94  26 10 54 90 .77 44 25  1 1 47 38 
Netherlands 52.45  16 0 54 94 .69 36 20  1 0 47 20 
Norway 77.13  35 12 54 97 1.25 35 21  1 1 57 24 
Poland 66.25  42 2 9 73 .45 35 20  0 1 14 13 
Slovakia 70.44  54 0 3 72 .47 48 20  0 0 13 25 
Slovenia 97.55  48 3 41 88 .53 24 20  0 1 39 6 
Spain 62.20  16 2 36 97 .52 36 22  1 1 43 32 
UK 76.51  12 0 34 97 .76 24 28  0 0 49 25 
US 65.95  0 0 28 66 .35 0 0  0 0 16 2 
               
Mean 72.58  28.57 5.28 32.50 82.09 .69 29.50 20.45  0 0 6 2 
SD 64.91  15.01 5.33 17.47 16.67 .42 11.72 5.80  1 1 60 38 
MIN 0  0 0 3 47 .1 0 0  0.64 0.72 41.91 18.96 




Chapter 4  
Gender Inequality in Paid Work: A Cross-National Analysis on the Intersection of 
Class and Gender in the Labor Market 
 
Assessing gender inequality in a country is complex. It entails considering inequality 
between men and women within the labor market (e.g., earnings and work intensity). However, it 
also requires measuring the relative accessibility of the labor market to both men and women, 
with specific attention to the relationship between women’s lower engagement to paid work and 
wider patterns of gender inequality in a society. But for women to be able to partake in 
employment they need to have the time and opportunity to do so. Time restraints frequently 
affect women’s access to paid work because of the amount of time they dedicate to unpaid 
domestic work. Both this chapter and Chapter 5 offer a descriptive analysis of gender inequality 
across the class spectrum in 22 Western countries. This chapter focuses on standard measures of 
labor market engagement while Chapter 5 analyzes women’s economic dependence on men.   
The analysis here begins with a descriptive overview of women and men’s engagement in 
paid work (including employment rates, full-time or part-time work, and earnings). The results 
are presented for men and women of all family types and then separately for married or 
cohabiting21 parents of young children. The same measures of engagement with paid work are 
then analyzed across the class spectrum in all 22 countries.  
As stated in Chapter 1, during the height of the gender revolution, liberal second wave 
feminists concentrated their efforts at women gaining parity with men in the labor market. 
According to this tradition, which was particularly strong in the United States, the emancipation 
                                                          
21 From now on I will use the term cohabiting. This refers to couples that are either married, in a domestic union or 
living with their partner. I refer to them as cohabiting rather than “partnered” since I exclude from my analysis 




of women could be won only if they were first given equal opportunities in the workplace. 
However, current debates suggest that while some women may have gained parity with men 
these gains have been made on the shoulders of less privileged women. Thus, the gender 
revolution caused an ever-widening polarization among women (within their countries) in the 
West. Despite the enduring, public nature of debates over the legacy of second wave feminism, 
very little analysis has been done on contemporary class inequality among women. The goal of 
this chapter is to address this gap in the literature by systematically exploring gender equality in 
engagement in paid work by class in 22 Western countries.  
I expect to find that any class inequality found among women will be more exaggerated 
in countries that do not have work-family reconciliation policies that enable women, of all 
classes, to compete with men in the labor market. In all countries the responsibility of unpaid 
domestic work tends to fall on the shoulders of women and not men. Thus, in the absence of 
work-family reconciliation policies, that attempt to shift care work from the unpaid to the paid 
sector, women in the upper classes have an advantage over women of lower income because they 
have the means to outsource when it comes to domestic labor and can themselves stay in the 
labor market and compete with men.  
Therefore, countries that have less generous work-family reconciliation policies but may 
have instead either concentrated their gender equalizing efforts at strengthening women’s ties to 
the labor force (by implementing, for example, equal pay protections or gender-based affirmative 
action policies) or the home (e.g., home care allowances) I expect will show more class 
inequality among women in employment outcomes. However, I expect less polarization among 




ties to the labor market and men’s participation in the unpaid caregiving that takes place in the 
home. 
Descriptive results from Table 3.3. revealed that generosity in work-family reconciliation 
policy provisions roughly aligns with the country clusters that are used in this dissertation: 
Anglophone countries, Nordic countries, Continental countries, Southern European Countries 
and, Eastern European countries (presented in Chapter 2). The Anglophone and the Nordic 
countries place themselves on opposite ends of the generosity spectrum as predicted by the 
cluster analysis (see Esping Andersen, 2009, Korpi, 2000), while there is somewhat more 
variance in generosity within the other country clusters. As expected, the Southern European 
countries have very rudimentary policies, though Spain to a lesser extent than Greece and Italy. 
There is more heterogeneity in the Continental country cluster than predicted by the 
welfare regime typology presented in Chapter 2. The findings in Table 3.3. support Gornick et 
al’s (1997) findings about France pulling away from the rest of the Continental countries with a 
more generous work-family reconciliation package, particularly in child care expenditure. 
Furthermore, my findings demonstrate that Luxembourg is on par with France. The policy design 
in the Eastern European countries reflects the attempt to reintroduce, following the collapse of 
the Soviet model, the traditional familization regime. Maternity leave throughout Eastern Europe 
is longer than the ideal length of 40 weeks (as long as 85 weeks in Estonia), there is little or no 
leave for fathers, and the Eastern European countries have the lowest percentage of children 
under the age of 3 enrolled in formal care (with the exception of Slovenia).  
Across the board, the countries with the least generous work-family reconciliation policy, 
as measured in this dissertation, are the Anglophone countries along with Greece, Italy, Czech 




solutions and/or extended family to balance paid and unpaid work. I expect to find that in these 
countries women in the upper middle and upper classes will have higher earnings than women in 
the lower classes and they will in general be more active in the labor market: higher employment 
rates and less part-time work among the employed.  
Countries with the most generous work-family reconciliation policy are the Nordic 
countries, France, Luxembourg and to some extent the Netherlands. I expect to find that labor 
market achievements are distributed more evenly across the class spectrum in these countries, 
where there has been an effort to strengthen women’s ties to the labor market but also to increase 
men’s participation in household production. This has resulted in generous parental leave, where 
both fathers and mothers can—to varying degrees—take time off work to care for their newborn 
(or newly adopted child), and they have access to affordable quality child care when their child is 
older. Thus, the pursuit of a work-family balance is not restricted to women, or families, of 
greater means (I expect this pattern to be strongest in the Nordic countries and Luxembourg. 
While the Netherlands and France score high on many work-family reconciliation policies, 
France has only 2 weeks of FRE paternity leave and the Netherlands have 0 weeks, (Table 3.3). I 
expect paternity leave to be crucial in enabling women to engage in paid work on par with men).  
 
Employment rates 
Results for employment rates, labor market intensity and earnings are presented in Tables 
4.1-4.3.22 Each table presents findings separately for men and women of all family types and 
men and women who are cohabiting and have at least one child under the age of 6. In each table, 
                                                          
22 Some of the empirical work in this chapter updates results from a chapter by Janet Gornick (1999) titled 





countries are organized into five country clusters: Southern Europe, Anglophone, Eastern 
Europe, and Nordic.  
The employment rates reported in Table 4.1, are for prime working age men and women 
(25-54).23 The employment rate indicates the percentage of people that were employed at the 
time of the survey (2010-2014) in the 22 countries under study.  
The minimum, maximum, and average for each indicator are displayed at the bottom of 
the table. Examining the employment rates of men and women in all family types, there is less 
cross-national variation in men’s employment rates than in women’s. Men’s employment rates 
range from 72% (Spain) to 89% (Luxembourg and the Czech Republic) with an average of 82% 
across those countries. The average employment rate for women is much lower, at 72%, and 
ranges from 51% in Greece to 81% in Germany.24
                                                          
23 As a reminder, while the results reported in Chapters 5 and 6 are based on the subsample of cohabiting people, 
findings in this Chapter 4 are based on all men and women aged 25-54, regardless of their relationship status.  
24 Historically, women in West Germany contributed little to no income at all to their households. If employed they 
would normally work part-time. East German women however, typically worked full-time and still do to a greater 
extent than West German women. Since the reunification of East and West Germany, women’s contribution to 
household income has been increasing. However, many women still contribute less than 25% to the couple’s income 
and that is largely due to women being over represented in the low wage sector and doing the bulk of the unpaid 
work (Haupt, 2019). The reason why the employment rate measures so high in Germany is that the dataset contained 
in the LIS Database, following ILO conventions, counts people on “mini-jobs” as employed, regardless of the 
quality of those jobs. This has led to the fact that in the current official statistics Germany has one of the highest 







Table 4. 1. Employment rates and female to male employment ratio in 22 countries by family type. 
 All Family types Parents of young children 
  Employment rates  Employment ratio Employment rates  Employment ratio 
  Men Women Women/men Men Women Women/men 
Southern Europe          
Greece .73 .51 .70 .87 .52 .59 
Italy .78 .59 .75 .90 .55 .61 
Spain .72 .60 .84 .79 .59 .74 
Cluster average         .74 .57 .76 .85 .55 .65 
Anglophone       
Australia .88 .72 .82 .92 .61 .66 
Canada .85 .77 .91 .90 .70 .78 
Ireland .68 .60 .88 .70 .57 .81 
UK .86 .76 .84 .91 .68 .74 
US .82 .70 .85 .90 .60 .67 
Cluster average .81 .71 .86 .87 .63 .73 
Eastern Europe       
Czech Republic .89 .75 .84 .94 .48 .51 
Estonia .82 .81 .98 .92 .64 .70 
Poland .84 .69 .82 .94 .61 .65 
Slovakia .86 .77 .90 .93 .55 .59 
Slovenia .84 .77 .92 .93 .79 .84 
Cluster average .85 .76 .89 .92 .61 .66 
Continental Europe      
Austria .86 .77 .90 .93 .70 .76 
France .86 .76 .88 .91 .71 .78 
Germany .76 .76 1.00 .77 .79 1.02 
Luxembourg .89 .77 .86 .92 .74 .81 







Table 4.1 Employment rates and female to male employment ratio in 22 countries by family type (continued.) 
Cluster average .85 .76 .90 .90 .74 .84 
Nordic       
Denmark .81 .77 .95 .90 .79 .88 
Finland .79 .75 .95 .88 .56 .63 
Iceland .85 .79 .93 .89 .77 .87 
Norway .84 .76 .91 .93 .80 .86 
Cluster average .82 .77 .93 .90 .73 .81 
Minimum .72 .51 .70 .70 .48 .59 
Maximum .89 .81 1.00 .95 .80 1.02 




When analyzing women’s engagement in paid work it is important to compare their 
employment outcomes to men’s employment outcomes. Patterns observed in women’s 
employment experiences might be due to the structure of the labor market in their country, rather 
than gender differentials. This is perhaps particularly important when researching women’s 
engagement with the labor market so shortly after the great recession of 2008 because of the 
recession’s negative effect on men’s employment rates.  
A simple way to discern actual gender differentials within a country is to look at the 
ratios. The female to male employment ratio (column 3) displays a considerable variation across 
countries. In Italy, for every 100 men only 75 women work for pay while in Denmark for every 
100 men 95 women are working. This means that, while the overall women’s employment rate in 
Denmark is not the highest among these countries (77%), Danish women’s employment rates 
are, at least now, almost equal to men’s.  
The female to male employment ratio for parents of children under age six is lower in all 
countries compared to the ratio among people from all family types (except for Germany, see 
footnote 18.  This means that the gap between women’s and men’s employment rate is even 
larger for parents, consistent with the argument that the unpaid care work that takes place inside 
the home is largely on the shoulders of women. The most substantial difference in female to 
male employment ratio for parents of young children compared to people of all family types 
occurs in the Eastern European countries, with the exception of Slovenia. In the Czech Republic, 
women’s employment rate plummets from 75% to 48% for mothers of young children. This is in 
stark contrast to the employment experiences of Eastern European fathers. In the Czech 
Republic, for example, fathers of young children are more likely to be working than men of all 




The effect of having young children on employment rates (as suggested by these cross-
sectional results) is noticeably less severe in the Nordic countries (except for Finland). In most of 
the countries the female to male employment ratio for parents of young children is lower than for 
people of all family types both because employment rates are higher for fathers of young 
children and lower for mothers of young children, compared with people of all family types. In 
every single country fatherhood increases the employment rate, by as much as 12 points in Italy 
and 14 points in Greece. However, motherhood does not affect the employment rate as much in 
all countries. This is the reason why the difference in employment ratio between parents of 
young children and people from all family types is less exacerbated in the Nordic countries and 
the Southern European countries. In those countries the employment rates for fathers are higher 
(than for men without children); however, the employment rates for mothers differ very little 
from those of women without children.  In the Nordic countries, women’s employment rates are 
high and stay high even for mothers of young children whereas, in the Southern Europe 
countries, women’s employment rates are low within both groups of women.  
As stated earlier, these results indicate that there is logic to organizing countries into 
country clusters and to comparing outcomes reported in the Nordic countries, to those in the 
Anglophone, Continental European, Eastern European, and Southern European countries. While 
there is variation within the clusters, there are also clear cluster patterns. 
 
Women’s labor market intensity 
 While women’s employment rates indicate the likelihood that women are engaged in paid 
work, they do not tell us about the intensity or quality of their economic engagement. Part-time 




European commission, 2016). Much of this increase is due to involuntary part-time work which 
has increased by a third since 2007, for both men and women. Involuntary part-time work refers 
to people taking up part-time work or reducing their working hours because full-time alternatives 
have not been available. Still, about 75% of part-time work is considered voluntary – i.e., people 
have sought part-time work, for example, to reconcile a “standard job” with family 
responsibilities. Most of these part-timers are women (Eurostat, 2017; OECD, 2010; European 
Commission, 2016). The share of the employed workforce that works part time is presented in 
Table 4.2. Unfortunately, information on work hours is often missing in the microdatasets 








Table 4. 2. Proportion of men and women working part-time in 17 Countries, by family type. 
 All family types Parents of young children 
 Part-time work Female/male ratio Part-time work Female/male ratio 
  Men Women   Men Women   
Southern Europe      
Greece .03 .11 3.41 .03 .12 3.87 
Italy . .  .. .. .. 
Spain .05 .23 4.83 .03 .33 10.75 
Cluster average .04 .17 4.12 .03 .22 7.31 
Anglophone         
Australia .10 .44 4.23 .07 .66 9.50 
Canada .06 .18 3.18 .04 .23 6.50 
Ireland .13 .37 2.88 .12 .30 2.48 
UK .07 .37 5.05 .08 .55 6.76 
US .08 .20 2.60 .06 .28 4.63 
Cluster average .09 .31 3.59 .07 .40  5.97 
Eastern Europe         
Czech Republic .02 .08 5.57 .01 .24 30.32 
Estonia .04 .09 2.45 .03 .14 4.60 
Poland . .  .. .. .. 
Slovakia .01 .04 4.32 .00 .07 .. 
Slovenia . .  .. .. .. 
Cluster average .02 .07 4.12 .01 .15 17.46 
Continental Europe         
Austria .06 .48 7.83 .06 .80 14.05 
France .31 .39 1.23 .31 .46 1.50 
Germany .06 .49 8.46 .05 .72 13.15 
Luxembourg .03 .41 15.27 .03 .55 16.13 







Table 4.2 Proportion of men and women working part-time in 17 Countries, by family type (continued.) 
Cluster average .13 .50 7.58 .13 .65 9.28 
Nordic         
Denmark . .  .. ..  
Finland .04 .11 2.85 .03 .14 4.53 
Iceland .05 .19 3.88 .03 .21 6.73 
Norway .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Cluster average .04 .15 3.36 .06 .17 5.63 
Minimum .01 .08 1.25 .00 .07 1.5 
Maximum .31 .72 15.27 .31 .87 30.32 




The percentage of men that work part time is strikingly low in all countries, with an 
average of the national average of just 7% of men across countries engaged in part-time 
employment. (France is something of an exception, pulling up the country average, with 31% of 
its men engaged in part-time employment). Women are much more likely to work part time but 
the share of employed women who work part time varies greatly by country. The overall pattern 
indicates that women in Eastern Europe are the least likely – across all 22 countries – to work 
part time whereas women in the Continental European countries, in general, have the highest rate 
of part-time work. As an example, in Slovakia only 4% of employed women work part time 
while 72% of Dutch women engage in part-time work. The share of women who work part time 
is larger in all countries (but Ireland) when the sample is limited to mothers of young children 
(column 5, Table 4.2). The largest differences between the subgroups (mothers versus non-
mothers) are reported in Austria (32 points) and Germany (23 points). In all of these countries, 
men’s share of part-time work differs very little when comparing fathers of young children to 
men of all family types.  
There is a general perception in the literature that a high percentage of part-time work is 
necessary for high employment rates among women. However, Janet Gornick (1999) found in 
her analysis of gender inequality in the labor market that there was little correlation between 
rates of part-time work and employment rates in the countries in her study. The results in this 
chapter support and update those findings: generally, while there are cluster patterns in 
employment ratios there are no clear cluster patterns in part-time work. Specifically, while there 
are very high employment rates for women in the Nordic countries, those countries have lower 
shares of women working part-time than do most of the countries in this study (with the caveat 




factors (e.g., union rules, wage structures, social security benefit floors) explain why part-time 
work varies across these countries, even among countries with similar employment rates. 
 
Earnings gap 
Finally, gender inequality in engagement in paid work is assessed by examining women’s 
annual earnings in comparison to men’s.  The female to male ratio of annual median earnings, 
for men and women in all family types and for parents of young children, are displayed in Table 
4.3.  As stated earlier, the goal of this chapter is to analyze gender equality25 in a country 
between all men and women - not just those active in the paid labor market. The earnings ratios 
in Table 4.3. are therefore displayed by work intensity; men and women employed full time; all 
employed men and women (including those employed part-time); and finally all men and women 
of working age (this includes men and women who are not employed or whose earnings are 
zero). Given the large number of women (compared with men) that are not engaged in market 
work leaving them out of this analysis completely would distort the picture of gender equality in 
a country. Thus, Table 4.3 presents a broader picture of the distribution of labor market earnings 
between men and women alongside the standard earnings ratio (which allows an analysis of 
gender equality in the labor market) and the earnings ratio for the employed workforce.  
 
                                                          
25 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “gender equality” to mean “sameness” – that is, the absence of 
differences between men and women in the relevant outcomes.  That is different from “gender equity”, which 







Table 4. 3. Female to male annual median earnings ratio in 22 countries, by family type. 

















     
 
Greece .86 .80 .20 .88 .96 .22 
Italy .. .81 .43 .. .83 .31 
Spain .86 .74 .51 .78 .54 .25 
Cluster average .86 .79 .48 .71 .82 .45 
Anglophone 
      
Australia .84 .69 .53 .80 .60 .18 
Canada .78 .68 .60 .58 .61 .31 
Ireland 1.01 .76 .48 .94 .98 .32 
UK .85 .67 .54 .83 .56 .22 
US .78 .74 .57 .70 .72 .33 
Cluster average .86 .70 .54 .77 .68 .27 
Eastern Europe 
      
Czech Republic .76 .74 .59 .57 .61 .04 
Estonia .75 .71 .67 .48 .50 .21 
Poland .. .78 .67 .. .80 .15 
Slovenia .. .91 .87 .. .82 .70 
Slovakia .80 .80 .69 .66 .58 .00 
Cluster average .76 .79 .70 .52 .66 .21 
 







Table 4.3 Female to male annual median earnings ratio in 22 countries, by family type (continued.) 
Continental 
Europe 
     
Austria .81 .58 .48 .50 .28 .13 
Germany .79 .54 .47 .65 .32 .22 
Luxembourg .93 .75 .63 .83 .64 .56 
Netherlands .82 .62 .56 .82 .65 .50 
France .89 .80 .71 .81 .77 .51 
Cluster average .84 .65 .56 .80 .53 .38 
Nordic 
      
Norway .. .75 .70 .. .61 .49 
Denmark .. .86 .82 .. .86 .68 
Iceland .78 .69 .65 .68 .65 .44 
Finland .81 .78 .78 .69 .69 .39 
Cluster average .82 .78 .74 .69 .71 .49 
Min .75 .54 .20 .48 .28 .00 
Max 1.01 .91 .87 .94 .98 .70 
Unweighted 
average 




In all countries, the female to male earnings ratio is lower when the sample is everyone 
employed (including part-time workers) than when just examining the full-time employed. The 
earnings ratio then decreases even further when all people of working age are included, 
regardless of labor market status. This is, as demonstrated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, because women 
are both less likely to be employed and, when they are employed, they are more likely to work 
part-time.  
Consider the example of the United States: according to the standard earnings ratio, 
women in the US earn 78 cents on the male dollar (which is relatively impressive). However, 
when women who work part-time are included, the earnings ratio drops to 74 cents on the male 
dollar.  When all working-age women are included, we see that women in the US only earn 57 
cents on the male dollar. Thus, in the US, as in all other countries, widening the lens reminds us 
that women in general earn considerably less than men.  
Focusing on all employed men and women (column 2, Table 4.3) the earnings ratio 
ranges from a low of .54 (Germany) to a high of .91 (Slovenia). There is some variation within 
the clusters but also cluster patterns that are worth noting. Apart from France (.80) the 
Continental European countries have low earnings ratios; the earnings gaps between men and 
women are comparatively large in those countries. The Nordic countries and Eastern European 
countries have the highest ratios (or the lowest earnings gaps) except for Iceland (.69). When the 
sample is restricted to parents of young children, the earnings gaps between men and women 
increase—to varying degrees—in most countries. The drop in the earnings ratio is most 
noticeable in Germany (from .54 to .32), and Austria (.58 to .28). 
Taken together, the indicators of women’s employment activity, intensity and earnings 




are employed, they are more likely to work part time; and women’s earnings are always lower 
than men’s (even when controlling for work intensity). These patterns are even more pronounced 
for mothers of young children compared with fathers of young children. Men’s employment 
outcomes are not similarly affected by fatherhood. In most of these countries, fatherhood appears 
to be rewarded in the labor market. There are clear cluster patterns in employment rates where 
the Nordic countries and the Eastern European countries have the highest employment rates for 
women in the West, followed by the Anglophone and Continental European countries, while the 
lowest employment rates among women are found in Southern Europe. The share of employed 
women who work part time is lowest in the Eastern European countries but there is no clear 
cluster pattern among the remainder of the countries. Finally, annual earnings among employed 
women are lowest in the Continental European countries but the rest of the countries vary 
beyond their clustering.  
 
Gender equality and the polarization of women. 
Considerable research exists on the cross-national portrait of gender inequality in the 
labor market but few have explored the extent to which labor market gender gaps vary by class. 
Findings in the previous section indicate that although women still trail behind men in 
engagement in paid work, the gender employment ratio is quite high in all of these countries and, 
in many of them, the gender earnings ratios (at least for men and women working full-time), is 
also quite high. The following section turns the analysis to class differences in employment 
ratios, prevalence of part-time work, and earnings ratios. The question remains: are women’s 




upper classes been gaining parity with men in the labor market while working class women are 
left behind?  
 
Employment ratio by class 
The female to male employment ratio is presented by women’s position in the household 
income distribution, dividing households into the top 20% (income deciles 9-10), the next 30% 
(deciles 6-8), the following 30% (deciles 3-5) and the bottom 20% (deciles 1-2). I term these four 
groups of households: “upper class”, “upper middle class”, “lower middle class”, and “lower 
class” (see, e.g., Figure 4.1). Within each income bracket the countries are organized by country 
cluster.  
There is much less cross-country variation in employment ratios for women in the upper 
20% and upper middle 30% of the household income distribution than there is for women in the 
lower income brackets. The employment ratio is above .80 for upper-middle and upper-class 
women in every country (with the exception of upper-middle class women in Greece). In the 
lower 30% group, the employment ratio drops below .80 in all the Southern European countries, 
Australia, and Poland.  In the lowest 20% class bracket the employment ratio is at or below .80 
in all countries but the Nordic countries, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia and Germany. The 
cross-country range for women in the lowest class bracket is considerable, from .51 in Greece to 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lowest income  class                          Lower Middle Class                                    Upper Middle Class       Highest 
income Class
Female to male employment ratio, by household income




Women’s labor market intensity by class 
The share of employed women who work part time is largest in the lowest income 
bracket; see Figure 4.2. This is true in all 17 countries, and in most countries, only a very small 
percentage of upper-class women work part time.  The exceptions are the Continental European 
countries: Austria, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Germany all have a high percentage of 











































































































































































































































































































































Lowest  income class                          Lower middle class                                   Upper Middle Class        Highest  
income class
Percentage of employed women working part-time, by household income




Female to male earnings ratio by class 
The female to male earnings ratio for employed men and women is presented by class in 
Figure 4.3. Compared with the employment ratios from Figure 4.1 there is more cross-country 
variation in earnings ratios in all class groups. Like the employment ratio, the variation in 
earnings ratios is biggest in the lowest class group ranging from .54 in Germany to 1.23 in 
Denmark. However, on average the lowest class group also has the highest earnings ratio.26 The 
two middle-income brackets are the most similar across countries. In both groups the earnings 
ratio is at or above .60 in all countries except Austria and Germany (in the lower-middle class). 
Interestingly, the earnings ratio is the same or somewhat higher for women in the upper-middle 
class in most of the countries except for the Nordic countries and Estonia and Slovakia. This 
means that in those countries the gender earnings gap is larger for women from the upper 
middle-class households than lower middle class. Turning the analysis to women in the upper-
income bracket, the earnings ratio is again considerably lower in the Nordic countries and at least 
the same or slightly lower in all countries except the Continental countries (except France and 
Germany) and Spain and Slovenia. This means that in upper-class households women are 
generally earning less compared to men than are women in other social classes. 
 
                                                          
































































































































































































































































































































































































































Lowest income class                         Lower middle class                                  Upper Middle Class           Highest 
income Class 





Taken together, the results on class differences in labor market engagement indicate that 
there is more gender equality in employment rates and labor market intensity in the upper classes 
than the middle- or lower-income classes, in all countries. However, given that class is here 
defined by household income the relationship between class and employment rates is somewhat 
circular: it is hard for a couple to be in the upper-income bracket unless both are employed. 
Thus, one could argue that the high employment ratio in the upper class is not due to more 
gender equality found among upper class men and women but because of the nature of the class 
measure used in this analysis. Thus, to further explore the relationship between class and 
employment ratios I employ a separate measure of class in Figure 4.4, namely level of 
educational attainment. Thus, while the income class measure refers to the household level, the 
education class measure refers to the person level. 
The results for employment ratios hold when using education, as a proxy for class, in lieu 
of household income. On average, the female to male employment ratio is highest among 
persons with high education (.92), lower for persons with medium education (.85), and lowest for 
those with low education (.75).  
As previously seen in Figure 4.3, unlike employment rates and shares of part-time work, 
the annual median earnings ratio is higher for men and women in the lowest class bracket. This 
means that although women in the upper class are more likely to be employed and less likely to 
work part time there is more gender equality in earnings in the lowest income bracket. These 
findings support research literature that suggest that while the gender earnings gap has been 
decreasing in the last few decades it is currently largest at the top of the wage distribution and 





























































































































































































































































































































Female to male employment ratio by educational attainment
0.75 0.85 0.92




The median annual earnings ratios are displayed again in Figure 4.5, this time by 
educational level. The average annual earnings ratios are more equal across the income brackets 
when using education in lieu of household income. However, the female to male earnings ratios 
are now slightly higher (compared to the findings in Figure 4.3) for the upper classes than the 
lower classes: high education (.73), medium education (.69) and low education (.68).  The 
exception are the Nordic countries where on average the female to male earnings ratio is 
relatively even across the class spectrum if not slightly higher in the lower classes than in the 
upper-class bracket.27  
 
                                                          
27 These findings suggest that the two concepts of class (household income and education) have distinct 
relationships to women’s independence. The results change when the analysis shifts from household income to 
education because in that second framework (education in Figure 4.5) women and men are going to be more similar. 
It seems as if comparing the highest-income-class group in Figure 4.3 to highly educated women and men in Figure 
4.5, the earnings ratio is higher in the latter case because that group is more homogenous. In other words, in the 
highest income class in Figure 4.3 there might be highly educated men with high earnings married to women that 
have dropped out of college and do not earn as much. But when we shift to education and compare that group to the 
most educated (figure 4.5), we lose those hypothetical college drop outs, resulting in a higher earnings ratio between 
men and women. As for the lowest income class, the earnings ratio is actually higher in Figure 4.5 for low educated 
people. A likely explanation is that in the lowest income class household there are women that have a college 
education married to men with lower levels of education (see Qian, 1998, for findings on partnerships were women 
were more educated than their partner being more common than relationships were the woman was less educated). 
We can still assume that men are generally the higher earners in a couple, but if a woman has a higher degree than 
them that increases the earnings ratio. In the second figure however (Figure 4.5.) we lose those college educated 
women and are, again, comparing a more homogenous group, men and women with low education, so of course the 
female to male earnings ratio is going to be lower. In sum it seems like these differences observed have to do with 
the extent to which there is homogamy and how that varies across countries and across income groups. This 
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Gender equality in top wages 
 The final analysis in this chapter turns to gender equality in top wages. Scholars have 
suggested that women in countries with extensive work-family reconciliation policies (such as 
the Nordic countries) have a harder time reaching top positions and top wages because 
employers are afraid of hiring women, who might later take extensive maternity leaves, or 
exercise their rights to work part-time, or both. Evidence for this claim has been found in the 
share of women earning top wages being lower in the Nordic countries than, for example, the 
Unites States (where these policies are much more limited) (Albrecht, Björklund, and Vroman, 
2003). Based on these findings, scholars have made the claim that work-family reconciliation 
policies, that have the goal of increasing gender equality in the home and workplace, actually 
have a harmful effect on gender equality. 
However, these scholars are, for the most part, not considering all women in a country, 
but are instead focusing only on employed women. Thus, they analyze the share of employed 
women who are managers or have top earnings but do not consider how women in these 
countries are selected into employment in the first place. The share of women in the workforce 
who have less than tertiary education, and even less than secondary education, affects the pool of 
women with the potential for reaching top wages. The size of this group (that is, less educated 
women who are in employment) is larger in the Nordic countries compared to other Western 
countries.  
Examining women with low or less than secondary education (see Figure 4.6), there is 
extensive variation in employment rates across these countries. The US ranks quite low with 
only 45% of women with less than secondary education being employed, while in Iceland 71% 
of women with less than secondary education are employed.  When looking at the outcomes for 




even lower, with 65% of American women with less than tertiary education being employed, 







Figure 4. 6. Percentage of women that are employed, by educational attainment. 
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Given that there is so much variation across these countries in the percentage of 
employed women who are not highly educated, this chapter concludes with an assessment of the 
percentage of both employed women and all women (including the not employed) who earn top 
wages (as captured by annual earnings); see Figure 4.7. The countries are again separated into 
country clusters and the top graph displays the share of employed women in each country whose 
earnings are in the top 25% of the joint earnings distribution of men and women. The Southern 
European countries have on average the highest share of women earning top wages (29%), 
followed by the Anglophone countries with an average of 23%. The Nordic countries have the 
lowest average rate of top earning women (18%). Thus, the Nordic countries are lagging, 
particularly in comparison to the Southern European countries. This is in accordance with the 
aforementioned literature. 
However, when examining the percentage of all women that are in the top 25% of the 
earnings distribution the average naturally declines in all countries (because now women with 0 
earnings are included)—but to varying degrees. The largest drop is seen in the Southern 
European countries, where only 17% of all working-age women earn top wages. The Nordic 
countries are now equal to the Continental countries with 15% of women earning top wages and 
the Anglophone countries are only two percentage points higher, with 17% of all working-age 
women earning top wages. Thus, including all women in the analysis, the “harmful” effect of the 
Nordic regime disappears.  
Family policies affect the extent to which women join the labor force, but few scholars 
have observed that, in these processes, work-family policies interact with class in ways relevant 
for the socio-economic positions of women in employment (for an exception, see Korpi, 




chances of reaching top positions, or attaining high wages, researchers must consider that these 
policies are likely to influence the class composition of women selected into paid work. Among 
women who have not attained a university education, employment rates are patterned by 








Figure 4. 7. Share of employed women and share of all women that are in the top 25% of the 












Share of employed women in the top 25% of the earnings distribution of men 

















As discussed in Chapter 1, women in Western countries have made considerable gains in 
the last decades. They are today generally highly educated and active participants in the paid 
labor market. With women’s increased participation in paid labor and men’s decreased 
participation following the economic crisis of 2008, women’s employment rates are now in most 
Western countries, on average, on par with men. And yet, women’s earnings in all countries lag 
behind men’s, even when adjusting for part-time work. The unadjusted earnings gap is, of 
course, considerably larger because women are much more likely than are men to work part-
time. This lower intensity in the workforce is likely because women have the dual burden of 
being responsible for unpaid work in the home in addition to participating alongside men in paid 
work. Thus, women have a harder time reconciling paid work and family - especially in 
countries that have not implemented policies to assist people in balancing employment and 
family obligations.  
The burden of unpaid work placed on women becomes more apparent when examining 
engagement in paid work for parents of young children. While men’s engagement in paid work is 
unaffected by fatherhood, mothers of young children have the highest share of part-time work of 
all women and men. Mothers of young children are also less likely to be employed compared 
with all women and, if they are employed, they earn less. The Nordic countries constitute the 
only country cluster in which women’s employment rates are high and stay high even among 
mothers of young children. Ample evidence – from the research literature and from my own 
empirical work – suggests that this is because of generous work-family reconciliation policies 
that offer affordable child care and thus make it easier for women to return to their employment 




The class analysis revealed that there is much less cross-national variation in engagement 
in paid work among women in the upper middle and upper classes than for women of lower-class 
status. In general, employment and earnings ratios are high for upper class women while part-
time work is rare. There are two exceptions: upper class women in the Nordic countries 
experience a somewhat larger gender wage gap than women in lower classes (if assessed by 
household income and not education), and in the Continental European countries part-time work 
is still very common among upper class women.  
Engagement in paid work varies substantially across these countries for women in lower 
income households. Women in the lower income bracket in Eastern Europe and the Nordic 
countries, in general, report much higher employment and earnings ratios than do their 
counterparts the other countries. They are also less likely to work part-time than are lower 
income women in other Western countries. However, examining engagement in paid work across 
the class spectrum shows little variation for Nordic women across the classes, whereas in Eastern 
Europe women in lower income brackets seem to be doing slightly better than women in upper 
classes in their employment rates when compared to men of a similar class position.  
Although the benefits of extensive work-family reconciliation policies for women from 
lower income households, and particularly mothers, are mostly undisputed, some scholars argue 
that while some work-family reconciliation policies facilitate women’s work they do not enhance 
women’s occupational and economic achievement. In fact, policies such as maternity and 
parental leave are seen as possibly detrimental to women’s economic success. These scholars 
argue that policies that enable leave and part-time work create a harder and lower glass ceiling 
for women. Again, this is believed to be caused by reluctance on the part of employers to put 




Employers do not have the same fear about fathers, because in most of these countries fathers do 
not have as much paternity leave available to them and, even when they do have the right to take 
extensive leave, they are less likely to take full advantage of their entitlements (Mandel and 
Semyonov, 2006). Thus, as stated in Chapter 1, the claim of the “welfare state paradox” is that in 
countries with extensive work-family reconciliation policies, such as the Nordic countries, 
women are less likely to reach top wages and positions. 
 This chapter found that, in the Nordic countries, the gender earnings gap is larger for 
women in the upper class (whether measured by household income or education level) than 
women in the lower-class brackets. These findings lend some support to the argument of there 
being compression at the top in the Nordic countries. However, those findings are, like other 
research findings on this topic, based on the earnings of employed women alone. If scholars wish 
to assess the effect of work-family reconciliation policies on gender equality in a country they 
must assess how those affect all women and not just employed women. The percentage of 
women who earn top wages might be higher in the US than in the Nordic countries but there are 
also more women in the labor market in the Nordic countries who have less education and are 
not as skilled and are therefore less likely to ever reach top positions with top wages in the first 
place. 
Thus, the Nordic countries, with their extensive work-family reconciliation policies, have 
the highest employment rates, among the lowest share of women working part-time (at least in 
the two countries measured; Iceland and Finland) and highest earnings ratios across the class 
spectrum, and for mothers of young children. It is true that they also have, on average, a smaller 
















The late 20th century saw the large-scale entrance of women into the labor market. Yet, as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter, while women’s participation and status in the labor market 
have grown, inequalities persist. Women in the West are equally or more educated than men 
(Table 2.1), but they are also more likely to work part-time and have lower earnings. The 
sizeable difference in part-time work between men and women, and particularly between 
mothers and fathers, suggests that women still bear greater responsibility for the unpaid work 
that takes place in the home (including, and perhaps in particular, the care of children).  
Yet, while the measures collected in Chapter 4 offer a general reflection of women’s 
economic participation, they do not capture the extent to which women are independent. They do 
not capture the full portrait of a woman’s economic dependence, only her economic 
participation. The proportion of women participating in the labor force may be a proxy for 
gender equality, but, at a much more fundamental level, gender equality means women no longer 
being dependent on their male partners for their economic well-being. In this chapter, I assess the 
extent to which women in the West are economically dependent on their male partners. The 
analysis focuses on the subgroup of women who are cohabiting with a male partner and the 
extent to which they are economically dependent on those partners. In this chapter, I use two 
measures to assess economic dependence: I calculate women’s share of the couple’s income and 
women’s likelihood of falling into poverty if they were to separate from their male partners and 




While considerable research exists on women’s economic dependence in the US, few 
have extended this analysis cross-nationally (for an exception see Korpi, Ferrarini, & Englund, 
2013; Nieuwenhuis, Munzi, Neugschwender, Omar, and Palmisano, 2019). Cross-national, 
statistical measurements of women’s dependence will offer a necessary supplement to traditional 
labor market statistics.  
While most evaluations of women’s economic dependence have assumed that labor force 
participation is itself a measure of independence, in this chapter I go beyond that assumption and 
calculate the economic dependence of all partnered women, not just those who partake in the 
paid labor market. I argue that in order to compare countries on how well they are doing in terms 
of gender equality, it is imperative to consider all women and men, rather than just those in the 
labor market. The gender gap is not merely an earnings gap but rather an inequality in the ability 
to partake in paid employment and to be able to do so full-time28. One of the main reasons these 
three major gender gaps persists is because of how challenging it is to combine employment and 
family life. That balancing act affects women to a much greater extent than men. 
This chapter begins with a presentation of women’s share of total labor market earnings 
in their countries-that is, the share of a nation’s earned income taken home by all women, 
employed or not, (Table 5.1). In order to demonstrate the importance of including all men and 
women when measuring gender equality, I build on Table 4.3 (from Chapter 4) and measure 
women’s share of total labor market earnings in a country, including all men and women. Thus, 
the first three columns in Table 5.1 display the female-to-male earnings ratios from Table 4.3: 
                                                          
28 Of course, I cannot argue that some of these differences might not come from preferences or choices—that is, 
that some women might choose to work part-time or not at all. However, my inference from the literature is that 
there are constraints that are affecting women’s participation in employment. One evidence of this is the dramatic 
shift that happened in Eastern Europe where women had the highest employment rate of all women while there 
were social policies in place that enabled them to balance work and family life. But as those policies were removed 




for people working full time, for all employed people (including those working part-time), and 
for all working-age people (including those with zero earnings). Results for a composite index of 
women’s share of total labor market earnings are found in columns 4 and 5, (Table 5.1).  
Janet Gornick (1999) calculated this index (a transformation of column 3) in a much-
cited chapter on gender equality in the labor market. Gornick explains that this index combines 
gender differentials in activity rates, hours worked and earnings per hour, and thus provides a 
measure that combines multiple aspects of gender inequality. In Gornick’s words “Women's 
share of total earnings indicates the extent to which women command a share of labor market 
earnings in proportion to their numbers”. It has been over twenty years since the publication of 
Gornick’s findings and yet, comparing her work to the findings in Table 5.1, not much has 
changed. Women still take home a smaller share of the nation’s earnings in all countries. 
Gornick found that women in Finland, Denmark and Sweden were taking home the highest share 
of their country’s earnings (around 40%), and, while this is still true, the magnitude of women’s 
share in each of those countries has not increased in 20 years.  
Gornick’s research did not include Eastern Europe but the current study found that, of all 
included countries, women’s share is highest in Slovenia, where women take home 45% of their 
nation’s earnings. For women of all family types, their share of earned income is lowest in 
Greece and Australia where women take home only 35% of their nation’s earnings. Shifting 
attention to mothers of young children, there is greater cross-national variation in the size of 
women’s share of earnings taken home by parents of young children. Women with young 
children in Austria have the lowest share and take home only 20% of the total earnings of parents 




highest share among mothers in these countries, taking home 40% of the total earnings of parents 
of young children.   
Table 5. 1. Earnings ratios and women’s share of total earnings. Updated from Gender Equality 
in the Labor Market by Janet Gornick, in Gender and Welfare State Regimes ed. by D Sainsbury. 
New York: Oxford University Press.  
  Female/male earnings ratio   














parents with a 
child under 6 
(%) 
Slovenia .. .91 .87  45 39 
Denmark .. .86 .82  42 40 
Finland .81 .78 .78  42 33 
Ireland 1.01 .76 .48  41 39 
France .89 .80 .71  41 37 
Slovakia .80 .80 .69  40 25 
Poland .. .78 .67  40 31 
Spain .86 .74 .51  39 37 
Estonia .75 .71 .67  39 25 
Canada .78 .68 .60  39 31 
Iceland .78 .69 .65  38 34 
US .78 .74 .57  37 32 
Norway .. .75 .70  38 34 
UK .86 .68 .55  38 31 
Germany .79 .54 .47  37 26 
Italy .. .81 .43  37 32 
Czech Republic .76 .74 .59  36 21 
Austria .81 .58 .48  36 20 
Luxembourg .93 .75 .63  39 36 
Netherlands .82 .62 .56  35 33 
Australia .84 .69 .53  35 27 
Greece .86 .80 .20  34 36 
 
The notable differences between the earnings shares of mothers of young children and 
women of all family types again suggests that women are still the primary caregivers of young 
children. This comports with the literature on time-use, which consistently demonstrates that, 




for the majority of all the unpaid labor that takes place in the home (Ragnarsdóttir et al., 
forthcoming). However, commonly used measures of employment or earnings do not account for 
the unpaid labor women perform in their homes. That is mostly because this labor, and its value, 
is difficult to measure. Cooking, cleaning, laundry, grocery shopping, child-rearing: these are all 
tasks women perform to a much greater extent than men, and they do so alongside their paid 
market jobs. Scholars who research the “second shift” have employed the phrase “total work 
hours” to describe the hours people spend on paid work and unpaid work combined. Research 
finds that mothers in Western countries (whether single or cohabiting) tend to work more total 
work hours than fathers in all countries studied (Ragnarsdóttir, Kostecki, & Gornick, 
forthcoming). 
Considering the amount of work women do outside of the paid labor market, and the 
small share of the nation’s earnings they take home at the end of the day, it becomes clear that 
when assessing gender equality in the West, commonly used measures of engagement in paid 
work only tell part of the story. While women’s employment rates are high in many countries, a 
large share of women are still not in the labor market, and many who are work only part time. 
Again, this is especially true for mothers of young children, which makes it clear that women are 
struggling to reconcile work and family life. The cross-country variation in the economic well-
being of mothers depends, for the most part, on the extent to which the governments assist 
parents in reconciling work and family (Gornick & Meyers, 2009; Korpi, 2000; Blau & Winkler, 
2017). I argue that one way to capture the true economic well-being of women is to assess how 
economically independent they are.  A carefully constructed measure of economic independence, 




interplay between the effects of the market, the home, and the state on women’s economic well-
being.  
 
Economic dependency measured as women’s share of couples’ earnings 
In every country, women take home a smaller share of the nation’s labor market earnings 
than do men (Table 5.1). A vast amount of research suggests that having fewer financial 
resources of one’s own deprives people of bargaining power within their relationship. Moreover, 
being economically dependent on one’s partner greatly affects people’s agency because of the 
vulnerability it inflicts in the event of marital or partnership dissolution. This section explores the 
extent to which women in the West are dependent on their male partners for retaining their 
current economic situation. I assess dependence with two separate measures: women’s share of 
the couple’s joint income and the likelihood that women would fall below the poverty line of 
60% if they were to separate from their partners. Thus, for the remainder of this chapter all 
analysis is done on the subset of women who are cohabiting with men.  
When constructing the measures of economic dependence, I do not only use men’s and 
women’s labor market earnings but rather I calculate economic dependency by combining labor 
market income, capital income, public transfers and private transfers. I call this measure 
augmented earnings. 29  
The story of dependency is nuanced because of the third party that exists in a marriage, 
the state. Yet, most research on economic dependence does not account for the state’s 
involvement and relies exclusively on labor market earnings to calculate women’s share of 
household income (that is, her labor market earnings divided by the couple’s joint labor market 
                                                          





earnings). Although commonly used, this measure fails to consider other sources of income. 
Many people derive part of their income from public transfers (e.g., disability benefits), or even 
private transfers (e.g., transfers from other households). Ignoring public transfers is particularly 
problematic when comparing women’s independence across class and cross-nationally because 
state interventions vary considerably by countries. Additionally, including transfers in the 
dependency measure is important when assessing the economic well-being of all women, 
because women who are not active in the labor market might still be receiving some income in 
the form of transfers. 
Augmented earnings are disaggregated to show the share of women and men’s earnings 
that comes from labor market earnings, capital income, public transfers and private transfers and 
how the size of those shares vary across the 22 countries (Figure 5.1). In all countries, women 
aged 25-54 derive most of their income from labor market earnings although the ratio of labor 
market earnings to total earnings varies considerably by country. In most countries, capital 
income and private transfers are a small share of total augmented income. Public transfers are, by 
contrast, a sizeable share of total augmented income in many countries (see Norway), but very 
small in others (see Italy).  Compared with men’s augmented earnings, women derive a larger 
share of their augmented earnings from other income sources than labor market earnings. 
Moreover, women’s share of augmented earnings that come from public transfers is larger than 







Figure 5. 1. Women and men’s total income disaggregated by labor market income, capital 
income, public transfers and private transfers.  
 
I use augmented income in an attempt to include all income allocated to men and women 
but also to capture the involvement of the government in women’s economic well-being. While I 
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across these 22 countries, I also report the more common measure of women’s share, using only 
labor market earnings, and compare the two results. I expect to find that using augmented 
earnings rather than labor market earnings will result in more independence for women in 
countries that have generous work-family policies (that are distributed by cash), such as the 
Nordic countries, Table 3.3.  
Comparing women’s share of a couples’ total income measured with augmented earnings 
to the more commonly used measures of labor market earnings allows for an assessment of the 
involvement of the state, as well as capital income and private transfers, in increasing women’s 
economic independence (Figure 5.2). The blue bars in Figure 5.2 represent the share of couples’ 
income for all cohabiting women using labor market earnings: that is, her labor market earnings 
divided by the couple’s joint labor market earnings. The orange bars represent the share of the 
couple’s income using the augmented earnings measures: her augmented earnings divided by her 
and her partner’s joint augmented earnings. If women earned, on average, as much as their male 
partners, then shares reported in Figure 5.2 would be 50%. Yet, for women aged 25-54, in all 
countries, women’s earnings, whether measured as labor market earnings or augmented earnings, 


































































Women's share of couples' income: all partnered women.




As previously stated, most researchers of economic dependency rely on labor market 
earnings to calculate women’s share of a couples’ income. The share of a couple’s income 
measured with labor market earnings indicates that, in all countries, women contribute less than 
their male partners to their household income. The size of the share ranges widely from 29% in 
Italy to 46% in Slovenia. There are visible cluster patterns in terms of economic dependency. 
Women’s share of household income is lowest in the Southern European countries and highest in 
Eastern Europe (average 38%) and the Nordic countries (average 39%).  
However, when compared to the share measured with augmented earnings, it becomes 
clear that without taking transfers, as well as capital income, into account, researchers that rely 
on labor market earnings are missing part of the story. When women’s economic dependency 
includes augmented sources of income, there is a consistent decline in dependency relative to 
measures based solely on labor market earnings. The difference between the two measures varies 
across these countries but it is noticeably highest in the Nordic countries. When augmented 
earnings are brought into view, the difference is as high as 5 percentage points, bringing the 
Nordic countries closer to parity between men and women. The same applies at the opposite end 
of the state-intervention spectrum: countries with limited family policies, like the Continental 
European countries, see only minor differences in dependency when augmented earnings are 
brought in. Thus, the cluster patterns become even clearer when using augmented earnings to 
measures dependency. 
 
Economic dependency by class 
Figure 5.2 demonstrates considerable variation in economic dependency across countries 




most independent and Southern European women the most dependent. But do these patterns hold 
across the class spectrum?  
I expect to find that women’s economic independence will be distributed more evenly 
across the class spectrum in the Nordic countries, where work-family reconciliation policies have 
allowed women of all classes to partake in the labor market (by providing affordable quality 
child care, job-protected paid leave and by encouraging fathers to share in the responsibilities of 
the home).  In contrast, in the other country clusters, where policies have focused more heavily 
on the paid labor market (e.g., Anglophone countries) or the home (e.g., the Southern European 
countries and many of the Continental countries), I expect to find that women in the upper-and 
upper-middle classes will be more independent than women in low-income families.  
Because the Anglophone countries rely on market forces to shape gender relations, 
families need to find private solutions to reconcile work and family. Market based child care is 
generally easily available in these countries, but this care is expensive. Reports from the US have 
shown that low-income families pay as much as 30% of their household income for child care 
(Laughlin, 2013.). Thus, I expect women from lower income households to be more 
economically dependent on their male partners because they are more likely to leave the labor 
market in order to provide unpaid domestic labor.  
At the same time the Southern European and Continental countries (with the exception of 
Spain, France, and Luxembourg) have relatively weakly developed work-family reconciliation 
policies, (Table 3.3). Traditionally, individuals in these countries are expected to rely on family 
solutions to reconcile paid and unpaid work. Thus, when there are public policies in place that 
support the family those are characterized by presuming a presence of a mother in the home. An 




available (this is reflected in the percentage of children aged 0-2 enrolled in care in for example 
Greece 17% and Austria 19%, Table 3.3.). Likewise, child care for children ages 3-5, while 
frequently available, tends to be organized on a part-time basis. Findings from Table 3.3. show 
that most children aged 3 and older are enrolled in formal child care in these countries (except 
for Greece, which has the lowest enrollment rate of all countries in this dissertation for children 
ages 3-5 at 47%). However, as stated in Chapter 3, this data does not account for hours of care. 
Many facilities in Continental and Southern Europe provide only half-day care, do not provide 
lunch, and are often closed on Wednesdays (Korpi, 2000). Formal child care is therefore only 
meant to compliment care within the family and as a result women are more likely to enter the 
labor market on a temporary basis. 
The lack of full-time formal care has a particularly negative effect on women of lower 
social status in these countries. Families in Continental and Southern Europe are more likely to 
rely on informal care (either as their only care option or to supplement part-time formal care) 
than families in the Nordic countries. Informal care includes grandparents or other relatives, 
unregistered caregivers, nannies and au-pairs. Research shows that low-income households are 
more likely to rely on grandparents for care than high-income households. More affluent families 
are more likely to be able to purchase informal care, such as nannies and au-pairs, which may be 
more reliable than one that is provided in kind by relatives (Janta, 2014). 
Thus, I expect to find that women of lower income households in Southern and 
Continental Europe are more economically dependent on their male partners than women from 
upper classes because of a lack of affordable full-time care for children. This is largely due to a 




supplement part-time formal care with paid informal care, while lower class families are more 
likely to rely on family for supplemental informal care.  
Thus, while the Anglophone countries and the Continental/Southern European countries 
could be described as contrasting regimes (defined by market availability of child care) I 
ultimately expect their shared lack of generous work-family reconciliation policies in general, 
and affordable child care in particular, to lead to the same result: more class inequality in 
economic independence among women.  
A cross-national comparison of women’s share of couples’ earnings among upper class 
couples is found in Figure 5.3. Class in this part of the analysis refers to where women’s 
households fall in the household income distribution. Class inequality in degree of dependency is 
assessed by calculating women’s share of couples’ income for women in the top (20%), upper-
middle (30%), lower-middle (30%), and bottom (20%) of the household income distribution. I 
report on augmented earnings represented in the figures in orange.  
While the overall country pattern for upper income households is more or less the same 
as the pattern from Figure 5.2, the experiences of women in the highest earning families look 
more similar across countries, irrespective of policy regimes. This is mainly due to the Nordic 
countries’ share coming down (cluster average drop from 41% to 36%) and most other countries 
going up, with a noticeable increase in the Southern European countries (cluster average rise 
from 30% to 39% from Table 5.2). Likewise, for women in the highest earning families there is 
little difference in the size of women’s share whether measured with labor market earnings (blue 






































































Women's share of couples' income: families in the top 20% of the household income 
distribution




Women’s financial contribution to low-income households is presented in Figure 5.4. 
There is much greater cross-national variation in women’s shares among lower income women 
than among upper income women. There is now an even clearer divide between the Nordic 
countries and the rest of the country clusters, particularly the Continental and Southern European 
countries. While Finland, for example, sees an increase in women’s share from 39% among 
upper income women to 51% among lower income women, in Luxembourg there is a 
tremendous drop in share with women in the upper-class bracket contributing 40% to their 
household income but women in the lower-class bracket only 21%. There is a 37 point range 
from the highest share, in Estonia (58%), to the lowest in Luxembourg (21%). 
There is also a greater difference between the two income measures, labor market 
earnings and augmented income, when examining economic dependency for women in low-
income households.  In almost every country, women’s share of household income is higher 
when the augmented income measure is used. The difference is largest in Finland, Estonia, 
Czech Republic, Canada, Australia and the UK ( in all of these countries there was either no 
difference between labor market earnings and augmented earnings for women in upper class 
households or labor market earnings were higher, Figure 5.3). This means that the transfers 
included in the augmented income measure equalize gender differences within the household, 
especially in the least affluent households. The only countries where a woman’s share of the 
couple’s income is smaller using augmented income are Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland. There is likely something in the structure of transfers in these countries which is making 
men’s share larger when those transfers are included. One explanation might be that benefits 




countries compared to transfers more often received by women (e.g., maternity pay). Therefore, 
men do better in the second measures compared to women.30
                                                          
30 I am suggesting there is gender differentiation in the transfers that men tend to receive versus what women tend to 
receive, both in the frequency and the amount. This is based on my empirical findings in Figure 5.1 that show that 
share of augmented income that comes from public transfers is higher for men in Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland. However, the microdata I’m using do not allow me to directly answer that question because in several of the 
countries in my dissertation these transfers that I have allocated to men and women separately cannot be further 



































































Women's share of couples' income: families in the bottom 20% of the household income 
distribution 




I expected to find that in the Nordic countries women’s economic independence would be 
distributed more evenly across the class spectrum because of the extensive work-family 
reconciliation policies those countries have implemented—assisting women of all classes to 
juggle both paid work and family. At the same time in the other countries where policies have 
focused either exclusively on the paid labor market (e.g., Anglophone countries) or the home 
(Continental and Southern Europe), but failed to assist women in reconciling their work in the 
home and their work in the paid labor market, women in the upper and upper middle classes will 
be more independent than women of lower income. This is most likely because in the 
Anglophone, Continental, and Southern European countries women of affluent households are in 
a better position than women of lower income to find paid care for their young children (as full-
time care or to supplement part-time formal care) and continue themselves in paid labor, work-
full time and compete with men.  
I conclude this class analysis by focusing on the cluster averages and present women’s 
economic dependency across the class spectrum for mothers of young children compared with 
women of all family types, in each country cluster, Figure 5.5.31 Here, I rely solely on the 
augmented income measure and compare women’s share of couples’ income for all cohabiting 
women to the subgroup of cohabiting women that are mothers of children under the age of 6. 
Thus, this graph reveals not only cross-national differences between mothers of young children 
and all women but also the difference between those two groups by class. 
                                                          









Figure 5. 5. Women’s share of couples’ income for mothers of children under 6 and women of all family types by country cluster 













































Women's share of couples' income: cluster averages 
Mothers of children under 6 Women of all family types
Southern Europe Continental Europe




In all country clusters, mothers of children under the age of six are on average more 
economically dependent on their male partners than are women of all family types. The 
difference between the two groups is, however, noticeably less pronounced in Continental and 
Southern Europe, where women of all family types are doing not much better than mothers of 
young children.  
The class analysis reveals an interesting pattern as well. The difference between looking 
at all women or specifically mothers of young children is more pronounced in the lower income 
groups. This is true for all country clusters. Focusing on women of all family types (grey bars), 
there is a gradient drop in share in the Continental and Southern European countries when 
moving from the upper income bracket to the lowest income bracket, (Figure 5.4). Upper class 
women in these countries contribute as much as 39% of couples’ income while lower income 
women contribute as little as 21%. The pattern is reversed in the Nordic, Eastern European and 
Anglophone country clusters where low-income women are, on average, more independent than 
women of upper classes.  
 
Economic dependency by level of education 
As explained in Chapter 4, the relationship between class, as it is measured here, and 
employment rates is somewhat circular: it is hard for a couple to be in the upper-class income 
bracket unless both are employed. Thus, as a robustness check I conclude the class analysis by 
examining women’s share of couples’ income using level of education as a proxy for class. This 
analysis displays cluster patterns that are even clearer than when using household income. In 
every cluster there is a gradient decline in women’s share when moving from high education to 




across levels of education. The decrease in women’s share of couples’ augmented income is 
most pronounced in the Southern and Continental European countries where women with low 



























































































































Women’s poverty potential 
This chapter concludes with an assessment of how women’s economic dependency 
impacts their options. In other words, I examine the likelihood that women will fall into poverty 
if they were to separate from their male partners. Thus far, the findings presented in this chapter 
have demonstrated that women are, on average, economically dependent on their male partners 
and that this dependency does vary by class and country. Thus, to conclude, I will examine how 
women’s dependency might contribute to them becoming poor in the first place.  
I use an indicator, the poverty potential, introduced by Lennon and Rosenfield (1994), 
that measures the likelihood of a woman falling into poverty if she were to lose access to her 
partners income. The poverty potential is a binary measure, where 1 indicates that a woman 
would fall below the relative poverty line of 60% of each country’s equivalized income if they 
were to separate from their husbands and rely solely on their own income to support themselves 
and their children (if they have any). It is important to note that this is an accounting exercise. If 
a woman lost her partner, her own earnings behavior would likely change. The poverty potential 
is thus an indicator of vulnerability not an actual estimation of women’s poverty rate. 
Descriptive results of the poverty potential are presented in Figure 5.6. The poverty 
potential calculated using augmented earnings is displayed in the columns in Figure 5.6 and the 
actual poverty rate for cohabiting couples is in the rows. This presentation allows an evaluation 
of the extent to which the variation in the poverty potential is due to underlying variation in 
poverty rates.  
Comparing women in Denmark to women in the US, the poverty potential is 10 points 
lower for Danish women. However, the actual poverty rate is also 10 points lower in Denmark. 




other countries, this is not the case; rather, some of the variation in poverty potential is due to 
gender disparities. Considering the countries that all have a medium level of poverty among 
cohabiting couples, the poverty potential or risk for women still varies considerably across those 
countries. Comparing the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Finland with the Netherlands, Austria 
and Germany, it is clear that something “gendered” is happening in the latter three countries, 
other than the actual poverty rate affecting women’s poverty potential.  
Returning to the indicators from Chapter 4, it seems that the exceptionally high share of 
women that work part-time in the Continental countries is putting Dutch, Austrian, and German 
women at risk of poverty if they lose their partners’ earnings. In the Continental countries, 
policies targeted on closing the gender gap are comparatively weak. For example, while Dutch 
women have a high employment rate (female to male employment ratio of .87) and relatively 
high earnings for full time workers (female to male earnings ratio .82) the fact that 72% of 
working age women work part time means they are only taking home 35% of their nation’s total 
earnings—leaving them extremely dependent on their male partners. Moreover, women in the 
Netherlands, Austria, and Germany are, compared to the other countries, getting the least amount 
of their income from sources beyond labor market earnings (Figure 5.1). In other words, while 
there is heterogeneity among the Continental countries, compared to many of the other countries, 
the governments in the Netherlands, Austria and Germany are doing little to bring women and 


















































There are many ways of thinking about and measuring women’s economic well-being. 
Research on the gender wage gap, and on the effect of various policies on women’s earnings, 
tends to focus on women and men who are working full-time. Thus, there is extensive research 
on gender inequality that approaches the topic as a labor market issue. This is problematic, both 
because it does not measure inequality comprehensively, and also because this type of research 
captures only a segment of the population. While it is valuable to assess the extent to which 
women who have strong engagement in the labor market are paid less than men, these types of 
research are not measuring gender equality among all men and women in a country. These 
assessments are leaving out large numbers of women, including those who work part-time or not 
at all. By including all women, and thus using a broader lens than the standard earnings ratio can 
produce, the results in this chapter show that Western countries vary greatly in terms of the share 
of a country’s earnings that women are bringing home (35-45%). This means that while women 
in the West have made considerable gains in recent decades, they are still largely dependent on 
their male partners for their economic well-being.  
The results in this chapter indicate that women in all countries contribute less than 50% 
of couples’ income, and in some countries as low as around 20%. The consequence of this type 
of dependency is that a great number of women in these Western countries are at risk of falling 
into poverty if they were to separate from their husbands and thus lose access to their partners’ 
earnings and his person-level transfers. 
There is class inequality among women in terms of the proportion of their contribution to 
couples’ joint income. This is true in all the country clusters. However, the magnitude of the 
variation across class groups varies greatly across these countries and, interestingly, so does the 




spectrum, other countries show greater shares for upper class women, while yet other countries 
show the greatest share of household income for women from low-income households.  
Overall, women from low-income households in the Continental and Southern European 
countries are most dependent on their male partners. These results lend support to the expected 
findings that, because of a lack of work-family reconciliation policies in these countries and the 
emphasis of family policies (particularly in the Continental European countries) on women’s 
main responsibility being the home, there is greater class inequality in dependency in these 
countries than, for example, in the Nordic countries where it is easier for women in the lower 
income bracket to balance work and family life. While these findings support the expectations of 
this study about public policy they also demonstrate the importance of looking over the ledge at 
what is happening in the private market.  
According to Mills (2013), European women report the cost or availability of child care 
as their main reason for not working, or for working part time. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, while 
women’s labor force participation in Europe is often high, they have a very high rate of part-time 
work (especially women in the Continental countries). Moreover, there is class inequality in 
engagement in employment in these countries. Women of lower income classes are less likely to 
work than upper class women. Likewise, although upper class women in Continental Europe 
have relatively high rates of part-time work, they are still less likely to work part-time than 
women of lower income households in those countries. Mills et al found that child care usage in 
Europe is related to household income, with parents from the highest income groups using 
formal child care arrangements more often, while women from low-income households are left 




informal child care arrangements ( Mills found this to be true in all countries except for 
Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia and Germany). 
Results for the other country clusters vary depending on the class measure used. When 
women’s share is assessed by level of education all the expected findings are confirmed. In the 
Anglophone countries and Eastern Europe women with low education are more dependent on 
their male partners than women with high education (although there is more variance within the 
Eastern European country cluster). At the same time, in the Nordic countries women’s share of 
couples’ income is more evenly distributed across the class spectrum when measured with 
education.  
However, when women’s share is assessed by household income women in the lowest 
income bracket are less dependent on their male partners than women in the highest income 
bracket in these three country clusters.  This aligns with findings from Chapter 4 that showed 
that the female to male earnings ratio was higher for women from the lowest income households 
in these countries. This raises an interesting question that I will address in future work: Why do 
these two frameworks turn up somewhat different results for women’s economic independence?  
If women’s responsibility for the unpaid work that takes place in the home is partly what 
is causing women to trail men in the labor market it becomes evident that women’s possibility 
and inclination to outsource unpaid domestic work will affect their participation in the paid labor 
market. The findings in this chapter show that mothers of young children are even more 
economically dependent than other women and particularly mothers in low-income families 
(whether measured with education or household income). The extent to which mothers are more 




implies that mothers in some countries are getting support from the state that makes them less 
dependent on their partners.  
As stated, a carefully constructed measure of economic dependency can capture the effect 
of the market, the home, and the state on women’s economic well-being. It is, however, unclear 
exactly which social policies are associated with women’s independence and how. In the next 
chapter, I use multilevel modeling to analyze the socio-demographic and institutional factors that 




Chapter 6  
Women’s Economic Dependence and Work-Family Reconciliation Policies 
   
The previous chapters have shown how demographic factors such as motherhood and 
family size are correlated with women’s economic independence. They have further 
demonstrated that women’s economic dependence does vary by class—whether measured by 
household income or education. One compelling explanation of this variation is social policy. In 
this chapter I test that explanation by examining the relationship between education (a proxy for 
social class) and economic dependence cross-nationally, using a multilevel analysis.  I first 
examine the relationship between education (i.e., social class) and women’s augmented earnings 
relative to the median man in their country (hereafter, referred to as women’s relative 
earnings32), while holding socio-demographic characteristics constant. I then assess whether the 
observed association between education and women’s relative earnings is moderated by work-







                                                          
32 The median male earnings are based on the subgroup I am studying – partnered, working-age, persons.  The 
reason that I divide women’s earnings by men’s median earnings, instead of simply using women’s earnings as my 
dependent variable as is commonly seen in the literature, is two-fold: (1) To keep the analysis in a gender-equality 
framework and (2) because assessing women’s earnings in relation to men’s (in their own country) will, in essence, 
control for cross-country variation in earnings levels per se. (E.g., If Swedish women earn more than German 
women, I want that to reflect the fact that Swedish women have achieved more within-country gender equality, not 
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Figure 6. 1. Expected effects of work-family reconciliation policy on women‘s earnings relative 
to the median man.  
 
Women’s relative earnings capture women’s economic dependence on men by measuring 
how all working age women are doing economically, compared to the median man in their 
country. Throughout this dissertation, the focus has been on three major gender gaps: 
employment rates, hours among the employed, earnings per hour, (Table 5.1, Chapter 5). The 
outcome variable in this chapter, relative earnings, is a composite measure that combines all 
three. In other words, the outcome variable captures the economic well-being of all women 
compared to their male counterparts.33 34 
I expect to find that education (i.e., social class) has a direct effect on women’s relative 
earnings (path a, Figure 6.1). In other words, women’s level of education is associated with their 
earnings relative to those of the median man. However, in Chapter 5, we saw that the 
relationship between education and dependency is not the same in all 22 countries. In some 
countries, like the Southern European countries, women with lower levels of education are more 
dependent on their male partners, while in other countries, like the Nordic countries, degree of 
                                                          
33 While the only way to get a full picture of gender equality is to assess all three gender gaps (earnings, 
employment, hours), the downside to using a composite index like this one the researcher cannot discern how the 
policy is affecting the outcome variable. Is the policy raising women’s earnings, hours or employment rates? Thus, 
at the end of this chapter I estimate my models again while netting out the employment effects and hours effects.  





dependence varied much less among women with different levels of education. Thus, I further 
hypothesize that the relationship between education and economic dependence differs by country 
and that that variation can be, at least to some degree, explained by work-family reconciliation 
policies at the country level. First, I expect to find that work-family reconciliation at the country 
level will have a direct positive effect on relative earnings (path c, Figure 6.1). Next, I further 
expect to find that work-family reconciliation policy will have a moderating effect on the 
relationship between education and relative earnings (path b, Figure 6.1). Specifically, I expect 
to find that in countries that have implemented policies aimed at aiding families in balancing 
work and family, the association between education and dependency will be less pronounced 
(path b, Figure 6.1). In other words, I expect to find less class inequality (as captured by level of 




When datasets have complex structures such as the data analyzed in this chapter, they are 
often referred to as nested or clustered data. This means that observations (level 1) are clustered 
into groups of some kind (level 2). Here, the lower-level units are individuals nested within 
countries, whereas countries are the higher-level units of analysis. When analyzing nested data 
researchers can employ a variety of different methods. Clustering induces unobserved 
heterogeneity across clusters. This means that the conditional cluster means vary for unobserved 
reasons. Researchers of clustered data structures face difficult choices when confronting the 
model specification and estimation stages of their research. One option is to ignore the structure 




course, assumes that all observations in the dataset are conditionally independent (Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002). 
There are two other approaches social scientists most often employ, each with its 
advantages and disadvantages: 1) fixed effects models, and 2) random effects models. Unlike the 
complete pooling approach, that ignores unobserved heterogeneity altogether, these two 
approaches do account for unobserved heterogeneity, although in differing ways, (Bartels, 2009: 
Snijder & Bosker, 1999).  
In a fixed-effects model, dummy variables are created for each higher-level entity (less a 
reference category) and the random effects are not treated as draws from any kind of distribution. 
As a result, the between effects (associations at the higher level) cannot be estimated.  
While a fixed-effects model treats the level two entities as unconnected, a random-effects 
model treats them as random draws from a normal distribution. Thus, a random-effects model 
strikes a balance between the fixed-effects approach (where the level two entities are completely 
unrelated, and each exist completely independently) and a single-level model (where the 
assumption is that there are no differences between the higher-level entities—knowing one is 
knowing all), treating higher level entities as distinct but not completely unlike each other (Bell, 
Fairbrother, Jones, 2018). 
Because I expect to find differences in the effect of education at the higher level, I will 
use the random-effects framework. However, I do not employ a typical random-effects model 
because the standard random-effects model assumes that the within effect (β1W) and the between 
effect (β1B) of the level one variable (here education) are the same. In other words, a standard 
random-effects model produces a weighted average of the between and within effect of 
education, or β1




same, a random-effects model is appropriate and more efficient than the alternative model (one 
that separates the between and within effects) because it utilizes variations in both the lower and 
higher level to estimate the coefficient. If, however that assumption is not true, and the within 
and between effects are not the same, then that weighted average will have little substantive 
meaning (Allison, 2009: Schunck, 2013). This problem, sometimes referred to as cluster 
confounding, can be solved by building on a random intercept model but estimating separate 
within and between cluster effects. If the within and between effects are found to be the same, 
the researcher can proceed with the more efficient RE model. This type of modeling, that I will 
refer to as REBW(also named the hybrid model, unified model, between-within model, or 
random effects between-within model (REBW)), is specified in equation 4.  
 
REBW Model: Yij = β0 + β1W(xij-x̅i)+ β2Bx̅i+ β3zi + (ʋi+εij) 
 
Here xij is the country-varying level 1 independent variable (education), and zi is the level 
two independent variable (social policy). The variable xij is divided into two with each part 
having a separate effect: β1W represents the average within effect of xij and β2B represents the 
average between effect of xij. The β3 effect represents the effect of the country-invariant variable 
zi and is in itself a between effect. Of course, level 2 variables cannot have within effects because 
there is no variation within higher level entities (Bell, Fairbrother, and Jones, 2018). Finally, ʋi 
are the model’s random effects for individuals i, which are assumed to be normally distributed 






All the regressions presented in this chapter are limited to a sample of women aged 25 to 
54. I estimate a total of 18 models with a random-effects framework: Model 1 is an 
unconditional or empty model while Model 2 includes the within and between effects of 
education along with socio-demographic variables. Models 3 through 6 estimate the main effect 
and interaction effect for full rate equivalent maternity leave. Models 7 through 10 estimate the 
main effect and interaction effect for full rate equivalent paternity leave; Models 11 through 14 
estimate the main effect and interaction effect for child care support and finally Models 15 
through 18 estimate the main effect and interaction effect for working time regulations, (Tables 
6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4).  
As stated, the main goal of this chapter is to examine if countries’ average work-family 
reconciliation policy score moderates the association between education and women’s relative 
earnings. Thus, I begin the analysis by fitting a variance component model (also named 
unconditional model or empty model) to examine the variation in women’s relative earnings 
between and within the countries, Table 6.1. 
A variance components model is a random-intercept model that uses no predictors and 
thus simply shows the country average and the variation within and between countries. The 
equations are as follows: 
Level-1 Model: Yij = β0j + rij 
Here, i refers to individual cases whereas j represents the group or the countries. Thus, 
the dependent variable Y (here women’s relative earnings) for individual i nested in country j 
equals the average outcome in unit j plus an individual level error term. Next, I specify a separate 
equation for the intercept. 




This is necessary because there may be an effect common to all individuals within the 
same country. I therefore add a country-level error term where γ00 is the average outcome for the 
population and u0j is a country-specific effect. Combining these two equations produces the final 
mixed model: 
Mixed Model: RELATIVE EARNINGSij = γ00 + u0j+ rij 
 
Again, there are no explanatory variables included in this model. This model only 
contains random groups and random variation within groups. Here var(rij)=σ² or within country 
variation in the earnings ratio and var(u0j)=τ00 or between country variation in women’s earnings 
relative to the median man. Results from the variance components model indicate that the 
average ratio for women’s relative earnings across the 22 countries is 67.60, (Table 6.1). The 
variance component corresponding to the random intercept is 127.66. This estimate is 
substantially larger than its standard error, indicating that there is a significant variation in 
country means. Results for final estimation of the variance components model show that the 
unconditional model is statistically significant (p < 0.00), and thus multilevel models are 
appropriate, (Table 6.1).  
However, there will always be some variation in intercepts and slopes between countries, 
but this can simply be due to sampling variability. To examine true variability in intercepts, I 
calculate the intraclass correlation (ICC). I use the two variance components from table 6.1 to 
partition the variance across levels: 127.66/(3738.508+127.66)= 127.66/3866.168= 0.033. A 
value of 0.033 means that differences across countries account for about 3.3% of the variability 
in individual’s relative earnings.35 
                                                          
35 Because there is usually some degree of dependence among the observations from a given group, it is always 




Table 6. 1. Random intercept regression models for the effect of education on women’s earnings 
relative to the median man. 
 Model 1: 
Unconditional model 
Model 2: 
Between and within effect of 
education 
  SE  SE 
Intercept 67.60  2.42 100.68***  10.76 
Individual level fixed effects     
Age ----- ----- .73*** .02 
Age square ----- ----- -.06*** .00 
Children <6 ----- ----- -1.40*** .38 
Number of children ----- ----- -1.84*** .15 
Education within effects 
(High education as reference group) 
    
Medium education ----- ----- -28.80*** .32 
Low education ----- ----- -43.14*** .46 
Education between effects 
(High education as reference group) 
    
Medium education ----- ----- -33.84 18.00 
Low education ----- ----- -63.84** 25.79 
Random effects     
Country Variance 127.66 38.96 101.10 30.94 
Residual 3738.508 12.84 3440.747 11.96 
Intra class correlation .033  .028  
                                                          
grouped data is not necessary if the total variance in the dependent variables is less than 5%. However, between 
country variation with large individual-level samples rarely exceeds 10% and it is recommended to proceed with an 
analysis of grouped data if there are theoretical grounds for it or for consistency with existing literature. I therefore 




Next, I employ a random-intercept model for the effect of class and socio-demographic 
variables, Model 2, (Table 6.1). 
The intercept in Model 2 represents the average country ratio of women’s relative 
earnings, for women with high education, 100.68. The effect of education (i.e., social class) is 
net of the effect of women’s age, the number of children they have and if they have a child under 
the age of 6.  
Age, which is the only continuous variable in this model and has been centered, has a 
significant nonlinear effect on women’s relative earnings. The coefficient for age is significant 
and positive (0.73) while the age square coefficient is significant and negative (-0.06), which 
indicates that the relationship between age and relative earnings is concave. In other words, 
results suggest that the overall association of age with women’s relative earnings is positive but 
that the rate of increase declines as women get older.   
Having children under the age of 6 decreases women’s relative earnings by 1.40 points. 
The number of children women have also has a significant effect on the ratio. Specifically, with 
each additional child, the ratio of women’s earnings to the median man’s earnings decreases by 
1.84 points. These results align with well-known findings in the literature on the motherhood 
penalty (see Budig & England, 2001).  
Education is measured with two dummy variables: medium education and low education, 
with high education as the baseline group. The effect of each education dummy has been 
separated into within and between effects. The results from the REBW model indicate that there 
is a significant within effect of both medium and low education. A within effect means that there 
is a difference in the dependent variable (relative earnings) between two individuals in the same 




medium education and women with high education, within the same country, is 28.80, with less 
educated women earning less compared to the median man. The within country effect on relative 
earnings for women with low education is even stronger or 43.14 points lower than the relative 
earnings of women with high education. Points in this model represent growth or decline in a 
women’s dependence. 
There is also a significant between effect for women with low education compared with 
women with high education. A between effect means that there is a difference on the country 
mean Ӯ between two countries which differ 1 unit on group mean X̄. The between effect of low 
education on women’s relative earnings is -63.84. In other words, countries with generally higher 
levels of “less educated” women have 63.84 points lower average relative earnings than 
countries with generally higher proportions of “highly educated” women (the reference group).  
The between effect of medium education was not significant. This means that, for a given 
country, having medium education (as opposed to high education) is associated with lower 
relative earnings (this is the significant within effect), but, across countries, having generally 
higher levels of women with medium education (as opposed to high education) is not 
significantly associated with lower relative earnings on average.  
A t-test can be used to test if the within group and between group regression coefficients 
are significantly different from one another. The t-test statistic for testing the within group 
regression for low education is -43.14/0.46= -93.78 and the t-test for testing the between group 
regression for low education is -63.84/25.79= -2.48. Both are highly significant. Thus, we may 
conclude that the within and between group regression coefficients are different, indeed. These 
results are a good example of the importance of separating the within and between effects of the 




with a REWB model because a standard random-effects model—that assumes that the 
coefficients for within and between effects are the same—would not be appropriate.  
Finally, including the education variables and the socio-demographic variables decreases 
the variance of country-level intercepts by 21% (from 127.66 to 101.10) and reduces the 
individual level variance by 8% (from 3738.508 to 3440.747), Model 1 and 2. The intraclass 
correlation for this Model 2 is 0.028, meaning that roughly 2.8% of the variance still found in 
relative earnings is attributable to country traits.  
In the subsequent models, I introduce the work-family reconciliation policies into the 
REWB model. Again, a multilevel model allows me to test if the effect of a level 1 variable 
(education) changes across scores on a level 2 variable (work-family reconciliation policies) 
(Raudenbush, & Bryk, 2002). The effect of a woman’s education level may be less important in 
a country that has implemented policies aimed at assisting men and women in reconciling work 
and family life. In other words, I expect to find that policy design changes the relationship 
between education and women’s relative earnings. The policies I test for in this chapter are full 
rate equivalent maternity leave, full rate equivalent paternity leave, child care support, and 
working time regulations. Descriptive results for the country level variables and the outcome 
variable are reported in Table 3.3 in Chapter 3: Data and methods.  
Because I only have 22 countries, I introduce one indicator at a time, and I begin with 
leave. 
 
Maternity and paternity leave 
When estimating random effects, it is important to consider the covariances among the 




covariance matrix for the random effects is unstructured (the default variance component 
structure assumes all covariances are zero). Unstructured covariance assumes that there is no 
pattern in covariance matrices: each variance and each covariance is different and has no relation 
to the others.  
As stated earlier I use two country-level variables to evaluate the association of leave on 
the relationship between education and women’s relative earning; full rate equivalent maternity 
leave (FRE maternity) and full rate equivalent paternity (FRE paternity). I begin by including the 
main effect of FRE maternity to the REWB model; see Model 3. The within effect for education 
is statistically significant while controlling for FRE maternity leave, both for medium and low 
education. The between effect is significant for low education only, (Model 3).The results for the 
fixed effects of maternity leave in Model 3 show that, while holding the within and between 
effects of education and other socio-demographic characteristics constant, women’s relative 
earnings decrease by 0.05 points for women who live in countries with 13-40 weeks of leave 
compared to less than 13 weeks of leave or more than 40 weeks. These results are, however, not 
statistically significant. If I expected to find that the slopes for our individual-level variables 
remain the same, whether these individuals live in a country with extensive work-family 
reconciliation policy or not, I would only use this model. However, I expect to find that social 
policy moderates the effect of education on relative earnings and I test for that in Model 4 when I 
introduce the interaction term.  
I introduce a total of four interaction variables in Model 4. Both interaction terms for the 
within effect of education are significant. In a given country, with FRE maternity leave of 13-40 
weeks (with 0-12 weeks or over 40 weeks as baseline group), the effect of having medium 




18.02 points.  Likewise, in a given country where FRE maternity leave is 13-40 weeks, the effect 
of having low education (with high education as a baseline group) increases women’s relative 
earnings by 17.23 points. Thus, the within effect of education found in Model 2—where women 
with medium and low education earn less relative to the median man compared with women with 
high education—is moderated by maternity leave. As expected, the negative effect of being less 
educated is lessened in countries with 13-40 weeks of maternity leave. In other words, in 
countries with 13-40 weeks of maternity leave, there is less class inequality among women when 
it comes to their earnings relative to the median man in their country.   
The interaction terms for the between effect of education were not significant. This means 
that while for a given country having a FRE maternity leave of 13-40 weeks is associated with an 
increase in the relative earnings of women with medium and low education (compared with high 
education), across countries, the relationship between education (i.e., social class) and average 
relative earnings is not significantly moderated by maternity leave. 
As stated, the outcome variable here is a composite index which includes all women, not 
just the employed. Therefore, in order to understand better how FRE maternity leave is affecting 
women’s relative earnings I conclude by running Model 4 again: once without zeros (thus netting 
out the employment effects) and again only among full-time workers (thus largely netting out the 








Table 6. 2. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and maternity leave. 










Controlling for hours 
worked 
  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Intercept 100.71*** 11.35 99.20*** 17.07 54.42** 14.72 58.73*** 11.99 
Individual level fixed effects         
Age .73*** .02 0.72*** .02 .59*** .02 .74*** .04 
Age square -.06*** .00 -0.06*** .00 -.04*** .00 -.04*** .00 
Children under the age of 6 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-1.41*** .38 -1.52*** .38 1.28*** .35 5.54*** .66 
Number of children -1.84*** .15 -1.63*** .15 -.37** .13 .29 .25 
Employment (1=employed, 0=not 
employed) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 48.80*** .34 ----- ----- 
Full time employment (1=employed 
full time, 0=employed part time) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 38.42*** .60 
Education within effects 
(High education as reference) 
        
Medium education -28.80*** .32 -40.08*** .52 -32.04*** .47 -29.59*** .65 
Low education -43.15*** .46 -55.25*** .88 -37.47*** .80 -38.94*** 1.20 
Education between effects 
(High education as reference) 








Table 6.2. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and maternity leave 
(continued.) 
Medium Education between -33.90 19.25 -29.78 24.88 -29.97 21.45 -22.11 17.59 
Low Education between -63.73* 29.07 -73.22 60.00 -78.92 51.73 -.55 42.73 
Country Level fixed effects         
Maternity leave 13-40 weeks 
(Less than 13 and more than 40 weeks 
as reference) 
-.05 5.81 7.68 23.40 -9.34 20.18 -20.90 18.03 
Cross Level Interaction         
Education within         
Medium * Maternity leave ----- ----- 18.02*** .66 14.33*** .59 4.26** 1.22 
Low*Maternity Leave ----- ----- 17.23*** 1.02 13.36*** .92 -2.11 1.86 
Education between         
Medium*Maternity Leave ----- ----- -26.78 46.58 2.90 40.16 41.27 35.86 
Low*Maternity Leave ----- ----- 17.16 68.75 56.10 59.27 29.16 51.85 
Random effects         
Country Variance 101.10 32.39 98.96 30.27 73.49 23.25 46.73 16.87 
Residual 3440.74 12.08 3423.53 11.90 2792.375 9.71 2942.3264 19.00 
Intra class correlation .028  .028  .025  .015  




Regressing relative earnings36 on the independent variables from Model 4 while holding 
employment constant does not change the results much. Being employed significantly increases 
a woman’s relative earnings by 48.80 points. In these models, an increase or decrease in points 
represents growth or decline in a women’s dependency as captured by her relative earnings. All 
the other control variables are still significant and show the same relationship with relative 
earnings as they did for all women, except for the effect of having children under the age of 6. In 
the previous model, having children under the age of six was significantly associated with a 
decrease in women’s relative earnings. But, when controlling for employment, the coefficient for 
young children becomes positive. In other words, having children under the age of 6 increases 
women’s relative earnings by 1.28 points, when holding employment constant.37  
The interaction coefficient for the within effect for both medium and low education is 
still significant, albeit slightly weaker. In a given country, having 13-40 weeks of maternity leave 
increases the relative earnings of women with medium education (high education as baseline 
group) by 14.33 points net of employment. Likewise, maternity leave increases the relative 
earnings of women with low education by 13.36 points while holding employment constant, 
(Model 5). The interaction term for the between effect of education is still insignificant. 
                                                          
36 Relative earnings are now measured as the augmented income of women over the median employed males’ 
earnings.  
37 This pattern holds for all the social policy variables. When controlling for employment, the coefficient for young 
children becomes positive. As this does not align with the literature on the motherhood penalty, I ran those models 
again but instead of using augmented earnings as a dependent variable I simply used labor market earnings as an 
outcome variable, like most researchers do. Regressing labor market earnings on the social policy variables, the 
effect of having young children stays negative even after controlling for employment. This means that having 
children under the age of 6 is associated with a reduction in women’s relative earnings unless we take into account 
other forms of income. When we consider transfers, having children under the age of 6 actually increases the 




Next, I largely net out the hours effect by controlling for full-time employment (Model 
6).38 Working full time is significantly associated with an increase in relative earnings of 38.42 
points. Regressing women’s relative earnings on the interaction variables while holding full time 
employment39 constant renders the interaction term between maternity leave and women with 
low education insignificant, (Model 6). This implies that the effect of maternity leave on the 
relationship between having low education and women’s relative earnings is a function of hours. 
However, the interaction term for women with medium education completed is still highly 
significant. Thus, in a given country, where maternity leave is 13-40 weeks, having medium 
education increases relative earnings by 4.26 points, net of full-time employment.  
Controlling for full-time work reduces the country variance by 53% from 98.96 (Model 
4) to 46.73 (Model 6).  
 
Full rate equivalent paternity leave has a highly significant direct effect on women’s 
relative earnings, net of education and socio-demographic characteristics (Model 7, Table 6.3). 
Having paid leave for fathers, that they cannot transfer to the mother, increases women’s relative 
earnings by 10.78 points. The main effects for both the within country effects and the between 
country effects of low and medium education are significant, net of FRE paternity leave. The 
between effect for both education variables is also significant after controlling for FRE paternity 
leave, (Model 7). 
I introduce the four interaction terms in Model 8. In a given country, with FRE paid 
paternity leave (no paternity leave as baseline group), the effect of having medium education 
                                                          
38 The number of countries has been reduced from 22 to 17 for this part of the analysis because of lack of data on 
full-time work in 5 of the countries.  





(with high education as a baseline group) increases women’s relative earnings by 6.00 points.  
Likewise, in a given country with paid paternity leave, the effect of having low education 
compared with high education, increases women’s relative earnings by 9.65 points. Thus, the 
within effect of education from Model 2—where women with medium and low education earn 
less compared to the median man than women with high education—is moderated not only by 
maternity leave (as seen in Table 6.2) but also paternity leave. As I expected, the negative effect 
of being less educated is lessened in countries with paid leave that is exclusively for fathers.  
The interaction terms for the between effect of education were not significant. This means 
that for a given country, having FRE paternity leave is associated with an increase in the relative 
earnings of women with medium and low education (this is the within effect), but, across 
countries, the relationship between education and average relative earnings is not significantly 
contingent on FRE paternity leave. 
Just as the interaction between maternity leave and education was assessed for all women 
and then again while holding employment and hours constant, I do the same for paternity leave; 
(see Model 9 and Model 10).  
Being employed significantly increases women’s relative earnings by 49.01 points. The 
results for education and the other socio-demographic variables found in Model 8 still hold when 
controlling for employment.40 The results for the interaction between paternity leave and the 
within effect of education are still highly significant. In a given country, FRE paternity leave 
increases women’s relative earnings by 3.60 points for women with medium education, net of 
employment. FRE paternity leave also increases the relative earnings of women with low 
                                                          
40 Again, having children under the age of 6 is the exception. The coefficient for young children becomes significant 




education by 6.70 points while holding employment constant, Model 9. The interaction term for 
the between effect of education is still insignificant. 
Finally, being employed full time (with part-time employment as the baseline group) 
increases women’s relative earnings by 38.42 points, Model 10. The main within effect of 
education and the effect of the socio-demographic variables are still significant. However, the 
interaction terms between paternity leave and education become insignificant when controlling 
for full time employment. 
Controlling for full-time work reduces the country variance by 48.74% from 67.92 








Table 6. 3. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and paternity leave. 
 Model 7: 








Controlling for hours 
worked 
  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Intercept 97.71*** 9.21 92.42*** 10.77 36.57*** 10.06 56.73*** 11.20 
Individual level fixed effects         
Age 0.73*** .02 .73*** .02 .59*** .02 .74*** .04 
Age square -.06*** .00 -.06*** .00 -.04*** .00 -.04*** .00 
Children under the age of 6 (1=yes, 
0=no) 
-1.41*** .38 -1.41*** .38 1.38*** .34 5.55*** .66 
Number of children -1.84*** .15 -1.80*** .15 -.51*** .13 .29 .25 
Employment (1=employed, 0=not 
employed) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 49.01*** .34 ----- ----- 
Full time employment (1=employed 
full time, 0=employed part time) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 38.42*** .60 
Education within effects 
(High education as reference group) 
        
Medium education -28.80*** .32 -33.06*** .59 -25.61*** .54 -28.89*** .65 
Low education -43.14*** .46 -50.30*** .90 -33.02*** .82 -39.68*** 1.17 
Education between effects 
(High education as reference) 








Table 6.3. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and paternity leave (continued). 
Medium Education between -37.22* 15.36 -23.28 19.10 -7.96 17.84 -20.17 17.89 
Low Education between -72.98*** 22.18 -79.87** 28.12 -38.37 26.25 1.63 39.04 
Country Level fixed effects         
Paternity leave available 
(0 leave as reference) 
10.78*** 3.72 24.65 19.00 29.28 17.74 -16.86 19.17 
Cross Level Interaction         
Education within         
Medium* Paternity leave ----- ----- 6.00*** .70 3.60*** .63 1.48 1.21 
Low*Paternity Leave ----- ----- 9.65*** 1.04 6.70*** .94 -.51 1.90 
Education between         
Medium*Paternity Leave ----- ----- -31.80 31.25 -41.75 29.17 27.35 30.15 
Low*Paternity Leave ----- ----- 2.72 44.91 -23.87 41.93 34.49 51.37 
Random effects         
Country Variance 72.91 22.40 67.92 20.93 59.27 18.24 48.74 17.45 
Residual 3440.747 11.96 3438.219 11.96 2802.062 9.74 2943.143 19.00 
Intra class correlation .021  .019  .021  .016  





Child care support index 
I use one composite index to assess the effect of child care support on women’s relative 
earnings, (Table 6.4). The child care support index ranges from 6 (low child care support) to 60 
(high child care support). I begin by including the main effect of child care support to the REWB 
model, (see Model 11). The results for the fixed effects of child care support show that when 
child care support increases by one point, women’s relative earnings increase by 0.28 points, 
holding the within and between effects of education and socio-demographic characteristics 
constant. The main effect of child care support is statistically significant. Again, points in this 
model represent growth or decline in a women’s dependence. 
Next, I see if child care support moderates the effect of education on relative earnings by 
introducing the interaction terms; see Model 12.  
I introduce a total of four interaction variables in Model 12. Both interaction terms for the 
within effect of education are significant. In a given country, a one unit increase in child care 
support is associated with 0.50-point increase in women’s relative earnings for women with 
medium education. Likewise, in a given country a one-point increase in child care support 
increases women’s relative earnings by 0.51 for women with low education (compared with high 
education). 
As I expected, the negative effect of being less educated, as demonstrated in Model 11, is 
lessened in countries with more extensive child care support. 
The interaction terms for the between effect of education were not significant. This means 
that while for a given country an increase in child care support is associated with an increase in 




across countries, the relationship between medium and low education on average relative 
earnings is not significantly contingent on child care support. 
Again, in order to discern the mechanisms behind the relationship between child care 
support and women’s relative earnings I run Model 12 again: once while controlling for 
employment and once controlling for full time work, Model 13 and Model 14.  
Adding employment to the model does not change the results for the interaction terms 
much. First, being employed significantly increases a woman’s relative earnings by 48.68 points, 
net of education and child care support at the country level.  
The interaction term for the within effect for both medium and low education is still 
significant. In a given country, a one-point increase in child care support is associated with an 
increase in the relative earnings of women with medium education by 0.37 points (high 
education as baseline group), net of employment. Additionally, a one-point increase on the child 
care support index is associated with a 0.41-point increase in the relative earnings of women with 
low education, while holding employment constant, (Model 13). The interaction term for the 
between effect of education is insignificant. 
Finally, I control for both employment and hours worked by adding a variables 
measuring full time to the model (Model 14). The interaction effect of child care support and 
education within on women’s relative earnings is still highly significant. The coefficient is, 
however, considerably smaller than it was prior to controlling for hours. In a given country, a 
one-point increase in child care support, increases the relative earnings of women with medium 
and low education (high education as reference) by 0.15 points, net of full-time work and socio-




Controlling for employment and hours worked reduces the country variance by 41.09% 








Table 6. 4. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and child care index. 
 Model 11: 
Child care 
index 
 Model 12: 
Cross Level 
Interaction 
 Model 13: 
Controlling for 
employment 





  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Intercept 101.63*** 9.77 103.40*** 15.02 51.81*** 14.03 42.94*** 16.42 
Individual level fixed effects         
Age .73*** .02 .72*** .02 .59*** .02 .74*** .04 
Age square -.06*** .00 -.06*** .00 -.04*** .00 -.04*** .00 
Children under the age of 6 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
-1.41*** .38 -1.51*** .38 1.28*** .34 5.56*** .66 
Number of children -1.84*** .15 -1.63*** .15 -.38** .13 .29 .25 
Employment (1=employed, 0=not 
employed) 
----- ----- ----- ----- 48.68*** .34 ----- ----- 
Full time employment 
(1=employed full time, 
0=employed part time) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 38.53*** .60 
Education within effects 
(High education as reference) 
        
Medium education -28.80*** .32 -49.70*** .76 -38.65*** .69 -32.41*** 1.15 
Low education -43.14*** .46 -65.96*** 1.26 -46.24*** 1.14 -42.91*** 2.07 
Education between effects 
(High education as reference) 








Table 6.4. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and child care index 
(continued). 
Medium education -25.95 16.74 -18.36 33.62 -3.84 31.40 -26.13 28.71 
Low education -78.25** 24.33 -109.87 64.55 -55.80 60.28 11.44 53.89 
Country Level fixed effects         
Child care support index .28* .13 .31 .68 .36 .64   
Cross Level Interaction         
Education within         
Medium*Child care support -----  .50*** .02 .37***  .01 .15*** .04 
Low*Child care support -----  .51*** .03 .41***  .02 .10 .06 
Education between         
Medium*Child care support -----  -.38 1.28 -.66 1.19 .88 1.26 
Low*Child care support -----  .85 1.74 .28 1.62 .22 1.47 
Random effects         
Country Variance 83.05 25.52 81.08 24.96 70.77 21.73 47.76 17.10 
Residual 3440.75 12.08 3419.08 11.88 2790.793 9.70 2942.266 19.00 
Intra class correlation .023  .023  .024  .016  




Working time regulations index 
I use a composite index to assess the effect of working time regulations on women’s 
relative earnings (Table 6.5). The working time regulations index ranges from 4 (little 
regulation) to 38 (extensive regulation). I begin by including the main effect of working time 
regulations to the REWB model (see Model 15). The results for the main effects of working time 
regulations show that when working time regulations increase by one point on a scale of 4-38, 
women’s relative earnings increase by 0.35 points, holding the within and between effects of 
education and socio-demographic characteristics constant. These results are, however, not 
statistically significant. 
Again, the focus of this chapter is to assess the moderating effect social policy has on the 
relationship between social class and women’s relative earnings. Thus, in Model 16, I introduce 
the 4 interaction terms.  
Both interaction terms for the within effect of education are significant. In a given 
country, a one-unit increase in working time regulations is associated with 0.75-point increase in 
women’s relative earnings for women with medium education. Likewise, in a given country a 
one-point increase on the working time regulation index increases women’s relative earnings by 
0.65 for women with low education. 
As expected, the negative effect of being less educated, as demonstrated in Model 15, is 
lessened in countries with more extensive working time regulations. 
The interaction terms for the between effect of education are not significant. This means 
that while for a given country an increase in working time regulations is associated with an 




education), across countries, the relationship between medium and low education on average 
relative earnings is not significantly contingent on working time regulations. 
Next, being employed full-time increases women’s relative earnings by 48.86 points, 
holding working time regulations, education and socio-demographic characteristics constant, 
(Model 17). The interaction term for the within effect for both medium and low education is still 
significant, net of employment. In a given country, a one-point increase on the working time 
regulation index increases the relative earnings of women with medium education by 0.55 points 
(high education as baseline group). And it increases the relative earnings of women with low 
education by 0.52 points, while holding employment constant, (Model 17). The interaction term 
for the between effect of education is not significant. 
I conclude by controlling for full-time employment.  The interaction effect of working 
time regulation and medium education within on women’s relative earnings is still highly 
significant. The coefficient is however considerably smaller than it was prior to controlling for 
hours. In a given country, a one-point increase on the working time regulation index, increases 
the relative earnings of women with medium education (high education as reference) by 0.13 
points, net of full-time work and socio-demographic characteristics. The interaction effect 
between working time regulations and low education is no longer significant. Finally, controlling 
for full-time work reduces the country variance by 65.68% from 83.46 (Model 16) to 28.64 








Table 6. 5. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and working time 
regulations index. 
 Model 15: 










  (SE)  (SE)  (SE)  (SE) 
Intercept 102.80*** 10.07 105.61*** 10.87 51.50*** 9.73 57.10*** 7.54 
Individual level fixed effects         
Age .73*** .02 .72*** .02 .59*** .02 .74*** .04 
Age square -.06*** .02 -.06*** .00 -.03*** .00 -.04*** .00 
Children under the age of 6 (1=yes, 0=no) -1.41*** .38 -1.44*** .38 1.35*** .35 5.56*** .66 
Number of children -1.84*** .15 -1.75*** .15 -.47*** .13 .29 .25 
Employment (1=employed, 0=not employed) ----- ----- ----- ----- 48.86*** .34 ----- ----- 
Full time employment (1=employed full 
time,  
0=employed part time) 
----- ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- 38.42*** .60 
Education within effects 
(High education as reference) 
        
Medium education -28.80*** .32 -42.89*** .72 -33.33*** .66 -30.23*** .86 
Low education -43.15*** .46 -55.84*** 1.08 -38.25*** .98 -38.04*** 1.45 
Education between effects 
(High education as reference) 








Table 6.5. Multilevel analysis predicting women’s relative earnings with socio-demographic characteristics and working time regulation 
index (continued). 
Medium education -36.01* 16.78 -10.77 29.99 4.31 26.86 -48.89** 20.22 
Low education  -69.04** 24.16 -64.65 40.77 -27.40 36.51 28.78 36.02 
Country Level fixed effects         
Working time regulation index .35 .19 1.13 .91 1.16 .81 -.03 .59 
Cross Level Interaction         
Education within         
Medium*Working time regulations ----- ----- .75*** .03 .55*** .03 .13** .05 
Low*Working time regulations ----- ----- .65*** .05 .52*** .04 -.12 .07 
Education between         
Medium*Working time regulations ----- ----- -1.51 1.50 -1.72 1.35 1.41 .97 
Low*Working time regulations ----- ----- -.69 2.10 -1.18 1.88 -1.02 1.54 
Random effects         
Country Variance 87.34 29.64 83.46 25.67 66.91 20.55 28.64 10.81 
Residual 3440.749 12.08 3430.108 11.92 2797.298 9.73 2942.499 19.00 
Intra class correlation .025  .023  .023  .009  





For ease of interpretation a visual display of the results from Models 4, 8, 12, and 16 is 
found in Figure 6.2. Each graph plots the predicted probability of women’s relative earnings 
while allowing the variables of interest to vary (i.e., education within, family policy and the 
interaction term), and holding remaining variables constant at their mean values. The graphs 
within Figure 6.2 demonstrate clearly that there is more class inequality in women’s relative 
earnings in countries that have not implemented work-family reconciliation policies, as measured 
in this dissertation. 
First, women of all education level do better (i.e., achieve a higher level of gender 
equality) in countries that have 13-40 weeks of maternity leave, FRE paternity leave, more 
working time regulations and more child care support. This includes women with high education, 
which suggests that, if there is compression at the top in women’s earnings in some countries, it 
is not because of the policies measured here, at least not for women’s relative earnings. 
Second, the predicted gap in relative earnings between women of different classes is also 
smaller in countries that have these policies. The values in the graphs show the gaps in relative 
earnings ratios between women with high education and women with medium education. 
Comparing those gaps for countries with more extensive work-family reconciliation policies to 
those with less extensive policies shows that the gap is considerably larger in countries with less 
extensive policies (as big as a 20-point difference in countries with more child care support 
compared with countries with less child care support). 41 
                                                          
41 The difference in the gap is always largest between women of high education and either medium education or low 
education (rather than between medium and low). The difference in the gap between high education and medium or 
low education tends to be about the same size. Only for paternity leave is the gap between high education and 





Thus, the relationship between women’s social class and their augmented earnings 
relative to the median man is contingent on social policies at the country level. This moderating 
effect of social policy is significant even while holding women’s socio-demographic 
characteristics constant.  The results displayed in Figure 6.2 are for the composite index which 
includes all men and women in a country (within the selected age range). Interestingly, the 
findings in this chapter indicate that different policies moderate the relationship between class 
and relative earnings differently. The moderating effect of work-family reconciliation policies 
can operate through more than one pathway, i.e., via employment rates, hours worked, or 
earnings per hour. For women with low education (compared with high education), work-family 
reconciliation policies affect women’s relative earnings by raising their hours. In other words, in 
countries that have more extensive work-family reconciliation polices, women with low 
education are more likely to work full time than they are in countries that have less extensive 
work-family reconciliation policies.  
Paternity leave also moderates the relationship between medium education and relative 
earnings through hours. But maternity leave, child care support and working time regulation 
moderate the relationships between medium education and relative earnings by directly raising 
women’s earnings. In other words, in countries with more extensive work-family reconciliation 
policies, women with medium education (high education as a baseline group) have higher 
relative augmented earnings than they do in countries with less generous work-family 
reconciliation policies. As stated in earlier chapters, for work-family reconciliation policies to 
have a positive effect on gender inequality they have to be very carefully designed. The results 




reconciliation policies; is the policy goal to raise women’s employment rates, to increase their 













Chapter 7  
Conclusion 
 
Much of the scholarship surrounding the question of gender inequality in Western 
countries has focused on labor force statistics. From this perspective, the best way to monitor 
women’s independence is to assess the extent to which they are participating in the workforce. 
Indeed, in recent history the goal of gender equality in the West has largely been pursued 
through non-discrimination policies particularly regarding workplace protections and equal 
access to educational resources.42 These policies have allowed for the large-scale entrance of 
women into the workforce and have made significant impacts on the equality of men and 
women. However, across a range of metrics, including earnings, gender equality remains elusive.  
The findings from Chapter 4 reveal that women are still not equal to men when it comes 
to earnings, employment rates or work intensity. In most of the countries examined, women’s 
employment rates are, on average, close to those of men (although never quite as high). And yet, 
in every single country in this study women’s earnings – both annual and hourly – still lag 
behind men’s earnings. I argue that the basis for women still trailing men in the labor market is 
because they have been expected to enter employment as men, without tools to reconcile paid 
work with the unpaid work that women often find themselves primarily responsible for. 
Likewise, there has not been enough effort on behalf of men in accepting their responsibility for 
domestic labor. 
                                                          
42 A representative case are the ongoing #meToo and Time’s Up revolutions. While ground-breaking women’s 
empowerment movements, they offer a recent example of the continued fixation on the workplace, at the expense of 





Eastern Europe provides a clear example of the consequences of removing tools to 
reconcile unpaid and paid work. As stated in Chapter 1, Eastern European women had 
historically been working on par with men, but, since the collapse of the Soviet regime, and the 
subsequent removal of policies that helped people juggle work and family, the difference in 
employment rates between women of all family types and mothers of young children became the 
highest of any region in the Western world (the average employment rate for women of all 
family types in Eastern Europe is 71% while the average employment rate for Eastern European 
mothers of young children is 63%).  
This discrepancy in engagement in paid work for different groups of women is further 
evident when examining women’s employment outcomes by their class status. The class analysis 
revealed that there is much less cross-national variation in engagement in paid work for women 
in the upper middle and upper classes than for women of lower social class. In most countries, 
employment levels (in the absolute) among upper class women are high and their earnings 
relative to men’s earnings are also high, while part-time work among them is rare (with the 
exception of upper-class women in the Continental countries).  
These same measures however vary greatly across countries among less educated women 
and women from lower income households. This indicates that something in the country 
structure, like family policies, is affecting women of lower social class more than women in 
upper social classes. In the absence of work-family reconciliation policies, women in the lower 
income brackets do not have the means to outsource their domestic work like women of higher 
socio-economic status might. Thus, without government assistance such as parental leave or 
publicly funded child care, women from lower income households are more at risk of falling out 




analysis showed little variation across the class spectrum in engagement in paid work in the 
Nordic countries. The Nordic countries have the most advanced work-family reconciliation 
policies of the countries included in this dissertation.  They have the longest FRE paternity 
leaves, the “ideal” maternity leave (with the exception of Finland which has 42 weeks instead of 
40), and extensive child care support and working time regulations. These policies are meant to 
help men and women reconcile work and family life without having to rely too much on either 
the market or extended family. However, the findings in this dissertation suggest that, in addition 
to bringing women closer in parity with men, these policies might be reducing inequality among 
women as well. 
I have argued in this dissertation that women’s independence is strengthened not merely 
by ensuring their presence in the workforce, but by the extent to which that workforce 
participation reduces their economic dependence on their male partners (and, to re-iterate the 
previous paragraph, that the best way to ensure economic independence is to reconcile paid labor 
with unpaid domestic labor trough a range of reconciliation policies). While labor market 
statistics are important, they do not capture women’s economic independence, only their 
economic participation. Leslie McCall (2010) found that, while women’s independence from 
sources other than their own income has grown substantially in the last decades, men’s 
independence has barely declined. This demonstrates the asymmetrical nature of recent 
transformations of the family.  Therefore, to further examine the relationships between gender, 
class, and economic well-being, I assessed women’s economic dependence on their male 
partners in Chapter 5.  
The findings reported in Chapter 5 revealed both within and between country variation in 




economically dependent on their male partners. In some countries, such as Greece, women on 
average contribute as little as 20% to couples’ joint income. Having a child under the age of six 
further exacerbates women’s dependence in all countries—albeit to varying degrees. The effect 
of the presence of young children is largest in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Austria and Italy 
where mothers’ share of couples’ income is as low as 10-15% when there are young children in 
the home. 
I also discover considerable within-country variation in women’s economic dependence. 
The findings in Chapter 5 support the hypothesis that women’s economic dependence on their 
male partners varies by class—whether measured by household income or education. The effect 
of class is not as strong in all countries, however, and the patterns of dependency vary. In the 
Nordic countries, women’s share of couples’ income is more evenly distributed across the class 
spectrum (whether measured with levels of education or household income) than in the other 
country clusters. But when women’s economic dependence is assessed by their household 
income women in upper income households are slightly more dependent than women from the 
lowest income class. On the contrary, when economic dependence is assessed with levels of 
education women with high education are slightly less dependent than women with low levels of 
education.  
Indeed, when women’s economic dependence is assessed by women’s levels of education 
a clear pattern emerges across the country clusters; women with higher levels of education are 
more independent than women with lower levels of education. This is true in all country clusters 
although in the Nordic countries the difference between women of high and low education is 
minimal (the largest gap is found in Iceland where women with low education contribute 32% of 




accordance with the argument that lack of generous work-family reconciliation policies in these 
countries, and reliance on either family or market solutions instead, is keeping women of lower 
socio-economic status from participating in the labor market to the same degree as men do.  
When women’s economic dependence is assessed by household income instead of 
education women in the upper class in the Nordic countries tend to have a slightly lower share 
than women of lower classes. At first glance, these results seem to lend support to the argument 
that women in countries with strong work-family policies are not reaching top-level earnings as 
much as they might in countries that do not have the same policies. However, this same pattern is 
observed in the Anglophone and Eastern European countries, where work-family reconciliation 
policies are very limited. Women from lower income households in those countries have, on 
average, a higher share of couples’ joint income than women from higher income households. 
The class difference is even bigger in the Anglophone and Eastern European countries than in 
the Nordic countries - indicating that there must be something other than the design of social 
policies in the Nordic countries affecting upper class women’s economic dependence compared 
to women of lower income households.  
Indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 4 any observed compression in top earnings is 
removed when the analysis is no longer limited to employed women. Moreover, as stated, when I 
examine women’s share of couples’ income by education instead of household income the 
pattern is as expected. Women with higher levels of education are more economically 
independent than women with lower levels of education in all countries. But, if not social policy 
then what might be affecting the economic dependence of women from higher income 
households in the Nordic, Anglophone and Eastern European countries? Because this pattern is 




differences have to do with the extent to which there is homogamy in household income and how 
that varies across countries and across income groups. In other words, these unexpected findings 
are likely due to the different nature of these class measures. Class measured with education has 
more homogamy embedded in it than class measured with household income.  
The between country variation in the findings from Chapter 5 suggest that there might be 
something in the country structure that affects the relationship between class and economic 
dependence. In Chapter 6, I employed a multilevel model and tested the effect of education (i.e., 
social class) on women’s augmented earnings relative to the median man in their country, while 
controlling for motherhood and family size.  
Findings from Chapter 6 confirm that, while women’s level of education is associated 
with their relative earnings, this relationship is moderated by the design of countries’ work-
family reconciliation policies. In other words, there is less class inequality among women in 
terms of their relative earnings, in countries that provide more generous work-family 
reconciliation policies as measured in this dissertation.  
As stated in Chapter 1, some argue that, while extensive work-family reconciliation 
policies might facilitate women’s work, they do not enhance women’s occupational and 
economic achievement. Maternity leave that is too long (and that is not paired with leave options 
for men) is understood to be the main culprit of a lower glass ceiling for women. Because of this 
I measured ideal maternity leave by creating a dichotomous variable where leave that was very 
long (over 40 weeks) was placed in the reference group along with leave that is very short (less 
than 13 weeks). While I cap ideal leave at 40 weeks that is still considerably longer than what 
most scholars argue is the ideal length of maternity leave (normally around 26 weeks). The 




leave range, except for Finland where FRE maternity leave is 42 weeks. Still, the findings here 
do not support any type of compression at the top for women, at least in terms of how they are 
doing relative to men. Thus, there does not appear to be compression at the top in countries with 
more extensive work-family policies. On the contrary, women with high education are doing 
better in countries that have implemented these policies compared to women with high education 
in countries that have not. Indeed, Figure 6.2 shows clearly how class inequality among women 
is less pronounced in countries that have implemented work-family reconciliation policies but 
that is because women with medium and low education do better in countries with work-family 
reconciliation policies and not because women with high education are doing worse.  
One of the more interesting findings from Chapter 6 is that the interactions between 
work-family reconciliation policies and education (i.e., social class) are significant even while 
controlling for family size and the presence of young children. This indicates that these policies 
moderate the effect of education on women’s relative earnings even for women who have, 
arguably, less need for these policies. In other words, work-family reconciliation policies fortify 
the position of all women in a country, not just those who most need help juggling work and 
family.  
In this dissertation, I have argued that focusing on labor market outcomes alone does not 
suffice if one seeks to make claims about gender inequality on a country scale. While statistics 
that pertain to those in the labor force include most working-age men, they usually include 
substantially smaller shares of working-age women; as reported in Chapter 4, in some countries, 
women in the labor force represent relatively few working-age women – and even fewer 
mothers. Thus, in Chapter 6, I ran my models for all women and not just those employed full 




gender gaps: in employment, earnings, and work intensity. However, after demonstrating the 
moderating effect of work-family policies on the relationship between education and relative 
earnings, using the composite index, I ran the same models again while netting out the effect of 
employment and hours. This was done to assess how these policies moderate the association 
between class and relative earnings. Results from Chapter 4 showed that, when looking at 
employment rates for all men and women, the female-to-male employment ratio is high in almost 
every country. What those statistics do not reveal, however, is that many of those women only 
work part-time. This suggest that one way to increase women’s average economic independence 
would be to implement policies that increase women’s hours. 
I found that different policies affect women’s relative earnings through different 
mechanisms. Furthermore, these mechanisms work differently for women of varying social class. 
First, paternity leave is the only policy that affects the relative earnings of women the same way-
regardless of social class. Paternity leave is associated with an increase in women’s relative 
earnings through increasing their hours. In other words, providing leave that is exclusively for 
fathers (which means that they either use it or lose it) allows women to partake in the labor 
market full time, to more extent. This is true both for women who have medium education, and 
for those with low education.  
However, the remaining work-family reconciliation policies—maternity leave that is 13-
40 weeks, child care support and working time regulations—affect women’s relative earnings 
through different mechanisms, depending on women’s level of education. In other words, the 
interaction terms between policy and having medium education remained highly significant after 
controlling for both employment and hours, whereas the interaction terms between policy and 




Thus, for women with low education, these policies increase women’s hours, which in 
turn raises their relative earnings. This aligns with the findings from Chapter 4 that showed the 
prevalence of part-time work among women and especially women of lower social class. This 
resonates also with the findings from Chapter 2 that showed that women with low education are 
more likely to be homemakers than women that have higher levels of education (Table 1.2), 
especially in countries that have less extensive work-family policies. 
However, for women with medium education (compared with high education), maternity 
leave, child care support and working time regulations are associated with higher relative 
earnings by directly raising women’s relative earnings. In other words, these policies moderate 
the association between medium education and relative earnings, not through raising women’s 
employment rates or work intensity, but rather by directly increasing relative earnings.  
Finally, if the goal of this dissertation is to revisit traditional measures of gender 
inequality and use a measure of dependence to paint a broader picture of how women in the West 
fair compared to the men in their countries, it would seem haphazard to construct a measure of 
economic independence including only labor market earnings and leaving out other sources of 
income. I therefore constructed an augmented earnings measure which includes women and 
men’s labor market earnings, public and private transfers, as well as capital income. Despite 
growing interest among researchers in intra-household inequality, most rely exclusively on labor 
market earnings when evaluating men’s and women’s contribution to household income. This is 
problematic, particularly when comparing economic well-being across countries, because people 
receive part of their income from capital and transfers, but the share coming from those other 
income sources varies.  Disaggregating women’s augmented earnings reveals that, while labor 




share comes from public government transfers—although the size of that share varies 
considerably across countries.  
Using an augmented earnings measure to assess dependency inevitably raises questions 
about the sociological meaning of different forms of income. In Chapter 1, I wrote that, within 
the framework of this dissertation, independence is seen as desirable, even though more 
independence does not necessarily indicate a higher level of economic well-being. An example 
would be the single woman who is perfectly independent because she has only her own earnings 
to rely on, but she might still be quite poor. However, she is still better off than a woman who is 
poor and also economically dependent on her male partner who might leave at any given time 
(making her situation even worse). Likewise, in comparison with women with no labor market 
earnings (who might be affluent but at the same time completely dependent on their partners), a 
woman who works for pay has more capacity to direct her own life. 
In my research, I only examine couples and compare women’s dependence on their male 
partners, across class and across countries. But, even when focusing exclusively on cohabiting 
people (and not single people), the meaning of independence, and how it is achieved, is still 
ambiguous. 
While some women in my study might be less dependent on their male partners than are 
other women, they might, instead, be more dependent on the state. They are therefore not 
completely self-reliant. What implications does that have, if any, for a woman’s status within her 
household? From a household bargaining perspective, are wages and transfers the same or 
different vis-a-vis their power in the household? In other words, if a man goes to work and earns 
$50,000 that he contributes to his household, and his partner works and brings home $30,000 




parity? I would argue that public transfers do increase women’s economic independence in the 
sense that they make women less vulnerable. In other words, contributing more to the couples’ 
joint income, even if through government transfers, can enhance equality within unequal 
households by providing exit options (Breen & Cooke, 2005).  
Findings for the poverty potential, in Chapter 5, demonstrate the importance of assessing 
women’s economic independence from their male partners, specifically in terms of the options or 
exit strategies available to them. Women who are economically dependent on their male partners 
have less bargaining power, fewer options, and subsequently less autonomy. They are more 
vulnerable to poverty in the event of a partnership dissolution. Mothers of young children are 
particularly vulnerable, especially in countries that do not help them to juggle work and family 
life, since they are likely to be more dependent on their male partners.  
In developing women’s share of augmented earnings, and measuring it across twenty-two 
high-income countries, I believe that my research offers an important contribution to debates on 
women’s independence, which have often focused disproportionate interest in workforce 
participation while ignoring how that participation is likely to influence a woman’s daily life 
(and vice versa). The gender revolution has been criticized for benefitting already privileged 
women, at the expense of the less fortunate. Scholars have argued that there is an ever-widening 
polarization among women, as middle- and upper-class women gain parity with men in the labor 
market, leaving other women behind. While I do not examine trends in inequality among women 
and cannot make any claims as to whether it has been growing or declining in recent years, I do 
provide a snapshot of how women of different social classes are faring, relative to men, in 




There are certain limitations in the work presented here. First, research that problematizes 
treating women as one homogenous group and concerns itself with the intersection of class and 
gender would ideally control for more demographics that have been shown to affect women’s 
economic well-being (e.g., race, immigration status, urban/rural living). While the LIS data 
provide information on immigration status and urban versus rural residence in some countries, 
those are missing in many of the countries in this study. Including those variables would have 
meant removing some countries from my analysis. Because I was only working with 22 
countries in the first place (which is on the low end when conducting multilevel analysis), I 
would not have been able to proceed with the same analytical strategy. 
Second, as stated, designing and constructing work-family reconciliation indices for 
research of this sort is a complicated exercise. While enrollment in public child care is a useful 
proxy for government-provided child care support, enrollment in formal care is not as precise. 
Likewise, the child care support index does not distinguish between children that are enrolled 
full-time and children that are enrolled part-time. Future research could further develop the child 
care index to include duration and hours of care and, if possible, information for enrollment in 
public care.  
In conclusion, the findings in this dissertation indicate that women with high education 
are doing considerably better than are women with lower levels of education, when looking at 
their employment outcomes (Chapter 4), their share of the couple’s income (Chapter 5), and their 
relative earnings (Chapter 6). However, the gap in relative earnings is smaller in countries that 
have implemented work-family reconciliation polices. This shows that if our goal is to achieve 
gender equality between all men and women, there needs to be involvement at the state level that 




research literature and the data provided in this dissertation—that maternity leave of an 
appropriate length (approximately 13-40 weeks long), non-transferable paternity leave, 
affordable full-time child care, and regulations on working time increase equality between men 
and women, but also among women. The evidence presented here further suggests that 
government provided child care might be particularly well suited to decrease inequality among 
women. This policy option unambiguously increases women’s labor force participation across 
the class spectrum without the potential detrimental effect associated with maternity leave (Blau 
& Kahn, 2017). While men’s share of domestic work and child care remains modest, it is not 
enough to simply invite women to enter the paid labor market to compete with men. With 
adequate policy support, women can balance the competing demands of home and work. Absent 
such support, the economic “playing field” appears grossly unjust, with the least fortunate 
scrambling over the obstacle of care work, while a minority of privileged women, having 
outsourced household responsibilities, can compete with men over paid labor on the small and 

































Australia Low 15% 10% 0.65 Finland 10% 4% 0.43 Norway 10% 4% 0.35  
Medium 15% 8% 0.51  18% 2% 0.13  14% 2% 0.11  
High 22% 7% 0.33  31% 2% 0.06  22% 1% 0.06      
        
Austria Low 18% 11% 0.59 Greece 9% 22% 2.32 Poland 7% 19% 2.67  
Medium 18% 4% 0.21  13% 16% 1.23  15% 16% 1.01  
High 18% 4% 0.23  19% 7% 0.37  27% 7% 0.26      
        
Canada Low 12% 5% 0.45 Iceland 21% 2% 0.09 Slovenia 16% 12% 0.78  
Medium 19% 4% 0.23  19% 2% 0.11  17% 4% 0.23  
High 25% 3% 0.12  34% 1% 0.04  25% 1% 0.05      
        
Czech 
Republic 
Low 12% 10% 0.82 Ireland 7% 11% 1.66 Slovakia 7% 16% 2.22 
 
Medium 21% 5% 0.24  17% 15% 0.88  23% 7% 0.29  
High 19% 6% 0.34  21% 7% 0.33  22% 6% 0.29      
        
Germany Low 18% 14% 0.78 Italy 8% 18% 2.19 Spain 16% 13% 0.80  
Medium 23% 7% 0.30  16% 10% 0.63  18% 9% 0.51  
High 22% 4% 0.19  19% 3% 0.17  24% 5% 0.20      
        
Denmark Low 9% 4% 0.39 Luxem- 
bourg 
23% 10% 0.46 UK 9% 12% 1.45 
 
Medium 18% 2% 0.11  20% 7% 0.33  18% 7% 0.41  
High 26% 1% 0.05  21% 4% 0.19  23% 6% 0.26      
        
Estonia Low 8% 3% 0.37 Netherl
ands 
20% 8% 0.39 US 10% 12% 1.17 
 









High 22% 3% 0.12  24% 2% 0.07  24% 6% 0.26      
        
France Low 9% 9% 1.00          
Medium 16% 4% 0.26          
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Women's share of couples' income in the Nordic countries; all partnered women and mothers of young 
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Mothers All partnered women



















































Women's share of couples' income in Eastern Europe; all partnered women and mother's of young 
children
Mothers of young children All partnered women
























































Women's share of couples' income in the Anglophone countries; all partnered women and mothers of 
young children
Mothers of young children All partnered women
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